

U.S. POLICY ON UKRAINIAN SECURITY

Y 4. F 76/2: S. HRG. 103-214

U.S. Policy on Ukrainian Security,...

HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

JUNE 24, 1993

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations



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U.S. POLICY ON UKRAINIAN SECURITY

THURSDAY, JUNE 24, 1993

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:13 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Biden, Feingold, and Lugar.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come to order, please.

Today, the Subcommittee on European Affairs examines a critical foreign policy challenge facing the Clinton administration—the fashioning of a sound American policy on Ukrainian national security. A nation justifiably proud of its newly gained independence, Ukraine struggles today with the dual task of consolidating free market democracy and building a new nation-state, challenges that would be difficult even in the best of economic times.

As Ukraine makes the transition from communism to capitalism, its leaders must also carry out the first responsibility of any nation, assuring the security of its citizenry. After an era of Soviet misrule that saw millions of Ukrainians die at the hands of Joseph Stalin and millions more scarred by the relentless repression of totalitarianism, leaders in Kiev understandably cast a wary eye toward the former colonial master in Moscow. Nor do the very legitimate security concerns of Ukraine derive only from its painful past. They rise also from the knowledge that even now there are those in Russia who aspire to restore the empire.

The aim of this subcommittee today is to begin to assess the policy of the U.S. Government in reacting to those security concerns. We convene this hearing in the spirit of inquiry, without a predisposition as to the details of U.S. policy. But there should be certain principles upon which we can all agree.

First, we must recognize that supporting a strong independent Ukraine will serve the interests of American foreign policy, not because it might provide a balance of power that would satisfy the apostles of Realpolitik, but because it is the democratically expressed desire of an overwhelming majority of Ukrainian people.

American interests are best served in remaining faithful to American values, a far cry from what one dubbed as the chicken Kiev pronouncement by our former President in 1991. Second, however, American policy should be clear and unequivocal on this, that with nationhood and independence comes responsibility to fulfill international obligations. Ukraine has a duty under international

law to adhere to commitments it made in the Lisbon protocol to ratify the START I Treaty, and to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear State in, "the shortest possible time."

Since making that solemn commitment last year, many voices in Kiev have asserted that Ukraine should reconsider its pledge. To its credit, its President has stated consistently that Ukraine will abide by the Lisbon protocol, but leaders in Parliament and the military have argued that Ukraine should become a nuclear state, at least temporarily. Even more ominously, there are reports that Ukraine now seeks operational control of the nuclear weapons on its soil, a question we will hopefully examine later today.

Third, and finally, we should understand that Ukrainian security hinges not only on the question of nuclear weapons on its soil, but on a range of issues including its own economic security. With an abundance of natural resources and 52 million strong, Ukraine has the potential to emerge as an economic power on the European continent. Fulfilling that potential, which will require dismantlement of the Soviet command economy, will entail a difficult transition for the Ukrainian people, a transition I believe the American people are prepared to assist in.

And so today we will begin these hearings, after hearing from my colleagues in their opening statements, with two panels of witnesses. The first panel we will hear from are representatives of the Clinton administration which recently expanded its dialog with the Ukraine Government regarding the security dimension of the U.S.-Ukraine relationship. In the second panel, we will hear from experts on nuclear command and control, as well as specialists who will discuss the Ukraine and Russian perspectives on security issues west of the Urals.

I will yield back to my friend from Indiana, Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I compliment you on calling this hearing on U.S. policy and Ukrainian security, and I would reiterate the comments you have made about the importance of Ukraine, the importance of the size of the country, its future, the importance of our bilateral relationship and the importance for us to make certain that we say that. I think that is a hallmark of this hearing today, that the concentration is Ukraine and that it should be clear to Americans and citizens of the Ukraine both.

It has been my pleasure to visit Ukraine three times in the past 2 years. I have visited with President Kravchuk and members of the legislature to try to indicate to them on behalf of President Bush, and then on behalf of President Clinton, how important we perceive that relationship. I am delighted that Strobe Talbott is here today, fresh from a visit to Ukraine, because his testimony will be most timely and informative, and I appreciate the witness that he is giving in this respect.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I think that we ought to indicate that this is perhaps the first of several visitations of this situation. You have correctly pointed out that we are working on questions that come from the Lisbon protocol, questions of nuclear security. The impression clearly has been abroad, on occasion in Ukraine, that this was our only interest.

How many times we say that it is not? Sometimes actions speak louder than words, and the fact that we are taking a look broadly at the economy and political relationship and strategic relationship, it seems to me, is very important in fastening the multipurpose aspects of this hearing that I am very glad we are having.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you. Senator Feingold.

Senator FEINGOLD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have no formal statement. I would just say that I give a lot of credit to the Chair for holding a hearing of this kind. These are the kinds of things that do not necessarily get a lot of credit back home for exploring. But the truth is this does raise some terribly important questions.

In one regard, it helps us to start understanding that although we can use the term former Soviet Union, there is a tremendous learning curve, especially for a new member of this committee, and also for the American people as a whole, to understand that each of these areas raises very serious separate questions, questions of history, questions of internal politics of the Ukraine, and of course, questions of relationships between the countries that used to form the Soviet Union. This is especially important in this regard.

At the same time, no one can underestimate the significance of this issue and this country's involvement when it comes to the question of the existence of nuclear weapons and the potential threat of nuclear weapons. I cannot think of two more important issues with regard to foreign policy, and I certainly look forward to listening.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Senator.

I would like now to call our first panel. Ambassador Strobe Talbott is Ambassador at Large and Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on the new independent states. Before joining the Government, he was editor at large for Time Magazine. Walter Slocombe is a Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. He was formerly a partner of the Washington law firm of Kaplan & Drysdale. Mr. Slocombe has also served in the Defense Department during the Carter administration, and has been a frequent witness before this committee, one who has always been informative and useful to us when he has been here. Would you gentlemen please come forward?

Mr. Ambassador, the floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF STROBE TALBOT, AMBASSADOR AT LARGE AND SPECIAL ADVISER TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE ON THE NEW INDEPENDENT STATES, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ambassador TALBOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Lugar, Senator Feingold. I am very pleased to have the opportunity to meet with your subcommittee today to discuss the administration's policy toward Ukraine. With the exception of our support for reform in Russia and the new independent states, no other issue has engaged more of my personal attention over the past few months than developing our relationship with Ukraine. Indeed, I see our overall new independent states policy and our Ukraine policy as mutually reinforcing. A democratic, prosperous, secure Ukraine is crucial to stability, democratization, and economic progress throughout the former Soviet Union.

By the same token, the continuation of reform in Russia is crucial to the security of Ukraine. That, Mr. Chairman, is the essence of my message to you and your colleagues today, and indeed, that has been the essence of my message to Ukrainian and Russian officials with whom I have met on this subject.

After the Vancouver summit, the Clinton administration launched a comprehensive interagency review that sought to refine and broaden U.S. policy toward Ukraine. Secretary Aspin's recent visit, as well as my own earlier trip to Kiev, followed directly from that policy review. These visits are part of a larger strategy of engaging the senior Ukrainian leadership in an effort to turn a new page in relations with Kiev. We have made it clear to our Ukrainian friends that we seek a broader, deeper, and richer relationship, a multidimensional relationship that takes account of our mutual economic, political, and security interests.

That relationship is based on five general principles, Mr. Chairman, and I believe that these are harmonious with the principles that you articulated in your opening remarks. The principles are these: As a large and resource rich country in the center of Europe, Ukraine has a crucial role to play in the security of Central and Eastern Europe. Ukrainian independence and sovereignty are important to the national interests of the United States. We want to see the Ukrainian State prosper.

Our relationship with Ukraine is independent of our relationship with Russia. Strong relationships with both countries are in our national interest as are good relations between Russia and Ukraine. Ukraine, given its history and geography, has legitimate security concerns. These can be addressed through a web of bilateral and multilateral ties that will help underpin Ukraine's continued independence and sovereignty and its place in the European security order. We believe it is in the Ukraine's own security interest to fulfill its Lisbon protocol commitments by ratifying START I and acceding to the Nonproliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear weapons state.

Mr. Chairman, it might be useful to review where we stand today in our efforts on the security, political, and economic fronts with Ukraine. We have put particular emphasis, given Ukraine's tragic history and intense security concerns, on expanding our defense and military cooperation with Ukraine. Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Slocombe will discuss the specifics of Secretary Aspin's recent visit to Kiev in greater detail. But let me say that this administration remains convinced that the best guarantee for Ukraine security is a good, solid relationship of mutual respect with a reforming democratic Russia.

That is why we are so encouraged by the results of the June 17 summit meeting in Moscow between Presidents Yeltsin and Kravchuk. They agreed on the principals for division of the Black Sea Fleet. In addition, both sides have agreed to pursue a comprehensive political treaty, to accelerate the signing of an agreement on dual citizenship, and to cooperate in solving fuel and energy issues on a mutually agreed basis.

We are hopeful that this meeting presages a positive turn in Russia-Ukraine relations that parallels our own strategy. The importance of this cannot be stressed enough, for at the end of the

day, the state of Russia-Ukraine relations will be the decisive factor in Ukraine's calculations of its national security interests.

We are playing our part by seeking to arrange a series of steps in the political and security areas which we believe should allow Ukraine to move forward, unimpeded, to ratification of START, Lisbon, and NPT. These steps include the following:

Security assurances: We are seeking to design confidence-building mechanisms. Already, Ukraine has received a draft text of security assurances from all five members of the U.N. Security Council. We are exploring ways to reassure all the parties to the Lisbon protocol that their security concerns will continue to be addressed.

The sharing of profits from the sale of highly enriched uranium: We are closely involved with the issue of Ukrainian compensation for the sale of highly enriched uranium from former Soviet nuclear warheads, and we have offered our assistance to facilitate the resolution of other points of tension between Russia and Ukraine.

Early deactivation: Secretary Aspin and I discussed with our Russian and Ukrainian interlocutors some ideas about how we might begin the process of weapons reduction in advance of entry into force of START I, and those discussions will continue.

SSD assistance: We are eager to move forward in the provision of assistance on the safety, security, and dismantling of nuclear weapons, and we hope that we can arrange for Ambassador Jim Goodby, our negotiator on these issues, to visit Kiev in the near future to work out the necessary details.

A U.S.-Ukraine charter: To affirm the basis of our political cooperation and the commitments of both countries, we have begun discussion of a U.S.-Ukrainian charter that might be signed at the highest level once Ukraine has fulfilled its Lisbon protocol commitment to ratify START I and accede to the NPT as a nonnuclear weapons State.

We are also committed to broadening and deepening our economic relationship with Ukraine with steps designed to encourage and promote market reform.

As you indicated in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, Ukraine faces problems similar to those of all the new independent states in trying to overcome the disastrous economic legacy of the Soviet Union. Although some progress has been made, Ukraine has been much more cautious in implementing structural economic reform than many of its neighbors, and its economic situation is steadily worsening.

In 1992, we focused much of our assistance on Ukraine's immediate humanitarian needs, providing more than \$110 million in grant food aid and concessional food loans, and \$18.6 million in urgently needed medicines and medical supplies. We intend to maintain this level of humanitarian assistance in 1993. But we are also developing technical assistance, initiatives designed to help Ukrainians help themselves. Let me mention just a couple of examples.

One hundred volunteers to Ukraine this year will be going out under the farmer to farmer program. We are also pursuing funding to help mount the first private auctions of retail stores in Lviv. The first OPIC mission to Ukraine last month saw opportunities for U.S. firms in Kiev and Kharkiv. Our work with the Ukrainian Gov-

ernment to draft a nationwide privatization program is going on right now, and we have pledged an additional \$15 million this year to support this program.

But as in all the states of the former Soviet Union, our ability to help Ukraine economically is tied to the Ukrainian Government's own commitment to serious economic reform and the commitments of the Rada or Parliament. We and our Western partners have advised Kiev that multilateral macroeconomic stabilization support would be available for Ukraine when it is ready to make the hard political decisions to reign in inflation, deficit spending, and credit emissions.

One element of the three-way power struggle that now seems to be underway in Kiev among the President, Prime Minister, and Parliament, is internal disagreement over the course of economic reform. As you know, the Donbass miners struck in early June demanding more economic autonomy and a national referendum on the nation's political course.

When the Parliament failed to agree on a response to the miners, President Kravchuk issued a decree creating an emergency economic committee within the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by Prime Minister Kuchma. Mr. Kuchma subsequently denounced the decree as economic dictatorship by the President and threatened to resign. Mr. Kravchuk then withdrew his decree.

However, Mr. Kravchuk's bid for greater power and continuing pressure from the miners helped persuade the Ukrainian Parliament to approve a referendum on September 26, in which both the President and Parliament will stand for national confidence votes. If either branch fails to garner a popular majority it must stand for reelection.

We applaud this resort to democratic means to resolve the leadership crisis. The people of Ukraine must have the decisive voice in their own future. Ukrainian politics, however, are now in a campaign mode at a crucial moment, with all the delays and distractions we know that entails.

But despite this, just 2 days ago President Kravchuk again confirmed his commitment to ensure Ukraine honors its Lisbon obligations as soon as possible. We were greatly encouraged by this statement because, as I said earlier, we are convinced that a nonnuclear Ukraine is in the best interests of the people of Ukraine and in the national interest of the Ukrainian State.

Mr. Chairman, let me sum up. Much hard work is ahead of us, and we should not underestimate the difficulties that remain. But I believe, based on my discussions during three visits to Kiev in the past month, that there are grounds for optimism about the future of our relations with Ukraine. Recent events appear to have refocused Ukrainian leaders' attention on important economic dimensions of their national security.

Russia and Ukraine have taken important steps to improve the relations between the two of them, and both Moscow and Kiev have made clear that they want continued U.S. engagement in these problems. We have every intention of remaining engaged, because the stakes for us, as well as for Russia and Ukraine, are enormous.

Thank you for giving me the time to address this critical issue, and after Mr. Slocombe's testimony I would be delighted to try to answer any questions you might have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Talbott follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR TALBOTT

Mr. Chairman, Distinguished members of the Subcommittee: I am pleased to have the opportunity to meet with you today to discuss the administration's policy toward Ukraine. With the exception of our support for reform in Russia and the New Independent States, no other issue has engaged more of my personal attention over the past few months than developing our relationship with Ukraine.

Indeed, I see our overall NIS policy and our Ukraine policy as mutually reinforcing: a democratic, prosperous, secure Ukraine is crucial to stability, democratization and economic progress throughout the former Soviet Union; by the same token, the continuation of reform in Russia is crucial to the security of Ukraine. That, Mr. Chairman, is the essence of my message to you and your colleagues today.

After the Vancouver Summit, the administration launched a comprehensive inter-agency review which sought to refine and broaden U.S. policy toward Ukraine. Secretary Aspin's recent visit as well as my earlier trip to Kiev, flowed directly from that policy review. These visits are part of a larger strategy of engaging the senior Ukrainian leadership in an effort to turn a new page in relations with Kiev.

We have made it clear to our Ukrainian friends that we seek a broader, deeper, and richer relationship—a multidimensional relationship that takes account of our mutual economic, political, and security interests. That relationship is based on five general principles:

- As a large and resource-rich country in the center of Europe, Ukraine has a crucial role to play in the security of Central and Eastern Europe.
- Ukrainian independence and sovereignty are important to the national interest of the United States; we want to see the young Ukrainian state prosper.
- Our relationship with Ukraine is independent of our relationship with Russia; strong relationships with both countries are in our national interest, as are good relations between Russia and Ukraine.
- Ukraine, given its history and geography, has legitimate security concerns. These can be addressed through a web of bilateral and multilateral ties that will help underpin Ukraine's continued independence and sovereignty and its place in the European security order.
- We believe it is in Ukraine's own security interest to fulfill its Lisbon Protocol commitments by ratifying START I and acceding to the NPT.

The Ukrainian people and their fledgling democratic government are struggling with serious political, economic, and societal problems which decades of Soviet domination left them ill equipped to handle. While Ukrainians have an ancient, proud culture, Ukraine has almost no experience relevant to modern, democratic statehood.

But while Ukraine faces great problems, it is also a nation of great potential. With its educated work force, agricultural richness, and industrial-military base, combined with its strategic location, Ukraine will in the next century take its place as a major country in Central Europe. The direction Ukraine takes now and the traditions it establishes over the next few years will have a profound effect on its neighbors—both to the east and to the west—and on the security and stability of the entire region. This is why we believe our bilateral relationship with Ukraine is of such importance and merits a serious commitment of America's attention and resources. In effect, our involvement with Ukraine now is a major step toward molding the shape of Central and Eastern Europe in the 21st century.

It might be useful to review where we stand today in our efforts on the security, political and economic fronts with Ukraine.

We have put particular emphasis, given Ukraine's tragic history and intense security concerns, on expanding our defense and military cooperation with Ukraine. Secretary Aspin's recent visit was the first step in a process that will unfold over the next few months, including a return visit to the U.S. by Ukraine's Minister of Defense Morozov later this summer. A Bilateral Working Group between our two defense ministries will work out a program of military-to-military contacts and exchanges.

Deputy Under Secretary Slocombe will discuss the specifics of Secretary Aspin's visit in greater detail, but let me say that this Administration remains convinced that the best guarantee for Ukraine's security is a good, solid relationship of mutual respect with a reforming, democratic Russia. That is why we are so encouraged by

the results of the June 17th Summit Meeting in Moscow between President Yeltsin and Kravchuk. They agreed on the principles for division of the Black Sea Fleet. In addition both sides have agreed to pursue a comprehensive political Treaty, to accelerate the signing of an agreement on dual citizenship and to cooperate in solving fuel and energy issues on a mutually agreed basis.

Furthermore—and this is very important from our point of view—President Kravchuk reiterated his determination to fulfill Ukraine's commitment to ratify START I and the Lisbon Protocol and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state. In turn, President Yeltsin reiterated Russia's readiness to grant Ukraine security assurances before Ukraine notifies START I and join the NPT. These assurances would enter into force once Ukraine has ratified the specific agreements. In addition, Prime Minister Kuchma has announced that the Russians have agreed to provide the necessary maintenance for nuclear weapons on Ukraine's territory even before START I ratification by the Rada. These are all very positive developments and the two Presidents ought to be commended for the statesmanship they have displayed in reaching these agreements. We are aware, of course, that previous arrangements reached at the Summit level between Russia and Ukraine have come undone. But we are hopeful that this meeting presages a positive turn in Russia-Ukraine relations that parallels our own strategy. The importance of this cannot be stressed enough, for at the end of the day the state of Russia-Ukraine relations will be the decisive factor in Ukraine's calculations of its national security interests.

We are playing our part by seeking to arrange a series of steps in the political and security areas which we believe should allow Ukraine to move forward unimpeded to ratification of START, Lisbon and NPT. These steps include:

SECURITY ASSURANCES

We are seeking to design confidence-building mechanisms. Already, Ukraine has received draft texts of security assurances from all five members of the U.N. Security Council. We are exploring ways to reassure the parties to the Lisbon Protocol that their security concerns will continue to be addressed.

HEU SHARING

We are closely involved with the issue of Ukrainian compensation for the sale of highly enriched uranium from former Soviet warheads, and we have offered our assistance to facilitate the resolution of other points of tension between Russia and Ukraine.

EARLY DEACTIVATION

Secretary Aspin and I discussed with our Russian and Ukrainian interlocutors some ideas about how we might begin the process of weapons reduction in advance of entry into force of START I. Those discussions will continue.

SSD ASSISTANCE

We are eager to move forward in the provision of assistance on the Safety, Security and Dismantling of nuclear weapons. (However, \$175 million in strategic nuclear delivery vehicle dismantlement assistance is tied to Ukraine's fulfillment of its Lisbon Protocol commitments.) Although we have conducted several rounds of discussions with the Ukrainians on SSD, we have not been able to move forward because the Ukrainians have not yet signed the implementing agreements for assistance. Since January, we have attempted to get Ambassador Goodby and his SSD team to Kiev to help move the process along, but have run into repeated difficulties. We will continue to press hard to finish up the agreements, so we can get assistance flowing to Ukraine as soon as possible.

U.S.-UKRAINE CHARTER

On the political front, our goal is to construct a framework within which our two nations can work together toward common goals. This political framework will be built on our commitment to the continued independence and sovereignty of the Ukraine state and on Ukraine's commitment to being a responsible member of the community of democratic nations. To affirm the basis of our political cooperation and the commitments of both countries in this shared endeavor, we have begun discussion of a U.S.-Ukrainian charter which might be signed at the highest level once Ukraine has fulfilled its Lisbon Protocol commitment to ratify START I and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapons state.

A STRATEGIC DIALOGUE

My Ukrainian counterpart, Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk, and I have agreed to have a senior level strategic dialogue which will bring inter-agency teams on both sides. We will meet regularly to search for areas where political cooperation can be expanded.

The U.S. will also work together with Ukraine whenever possible to encourage and expand Ukraine's involvement in regional and international fora. We will also enhance our program of public diplomacy, through our Embassy in Kiev and through programs promoting contact between Ukrainian and American citizens, to ensure that the people of both nations understand and support the political ties being forged.

We are also committed to broadening and deepening our economic relationship with Ukraine with steps designed to encourage and promote market reform. Ukraine faces problems similar to those of all the new independent states in trying to overcome the disastrous economic legacy of the Soviet Union. Although some progress has been made, Ukraine has been much more cautious in implementing structural economic reform than many of its neighbors, and its economic situation is steadily worsening. Recent figures indicate inflation is approaching 50 percent—a commonly recognized benchmark of hyper-inflation.

In 1992, we focused much of our assistance on Ukraine's immediate humanitarian needs, providing more than \$110 million in grant food aid and concessional food loans and \$18.6 in urgently needed medicines and medical supplies. We intend to maintain this level of humanitarian assistance in 1993, but we are also developing technical assistance initiatives designed to help Ukrainians help themselves. Some key examples include our plan to send 100 volunteers to Ukraine this year under the Farmer-to-Farmer Program; funding we provided to help mount the first private auctions of retail stores in Lviv—an initiative that Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Pynzenik has praised and wants to expand; the first OPIC mission to Ukraine last month which sought agricultural, space, pharmaceutical and defense conversion opportunities for U.S. firms in Kiev and Kharkiv. We are also working with the Ukrainian government to draft a nationwide privatization program and we have pledged an additional \$15 million this year to support this program.

But as in all the states of the former Soviet Union, our ability to help Ukraine economically is tied to the Ukrainian government's own commitment to serious economic reform and the commitment of the Rada. For example, we and our Western partners have advised Kiev that multilateral macro-economic stabilization support would be available for Ukraine when it is ready to make the hard political decisions to rein in inflation, deficit spending and credit emissions. But they are just not there yet.

In fact, one element of the three-way power struggle now underway in Kiev among the President, Prime Minister and Parliament is internal disagreement over the course of economic reform. As you know, the Donbass miners struck in early June demanding more economic autonomy and a national referendum on the nation's political course. When the parliament failed to agree on a response to the miners, President Kravchuk issued a decree creating an emergency economic committee within the Cabinet of Ministers chaired by Prime Minister Kuchma. Kuchma subsequently denounced the decree as economic "dictatorship by the President" and threatened to resign. Kravchuk then withdrew his decree. However, Kravchuk's bid for greater power and continuing pressure from the miners helped persuade parliament to approve a referendum on September 26 in which both President and parliament will stand for national confidence votes on September 26. If either branch fails to garner a popular majority, it must stand for reelection.

We applaud this resort to democratic means to resolve the leadership crisis. The people of Ukraine must have the decisive voice in their own future. Ukrainian politics, however, are now in a "campaign mode" at a crucial moment—with all the delays and distractions we know that entails.

But despite all this, just 2 days ago President Kravchuk again confirmed his commitment to ensure Ukraine honors its Lisbon obligations as soon as possible. Asked in a press conference if the referendum would postpone Rada consideration of START and NPT, President Kravchuk said he saw no reason why it should. We were greatly encouraged by this statement because—as I said earlier—we are convinced that a non-nuclear Ukraine is in the people of Ukraine's own best national interest.

Mr. Chairman, let me sum up. Much hard work is ahead of us and we should not underestimate the difficulties that remain. But I believe, based on my discussions during three visits to Kiev in the past month, that there are grounds for optimism about the future of our relations with Ukraine. Recent events appear to have

refocused Ukrainian leader's attention on the important economic dimensions of their national security. Russia and Ukraine have taken important steps to improve their relations. And both Moscow and Kiev have made clear that they want continued U.S. engagement in these problems. We have every intention of doing so because the stakes for us, as well as for Russia and Ukraine, are enormous. Thank you for giving me the time to address this critical issue. I would be delighted to answer any questions you might have.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, very much. Mr. Slocombe.

**STATEMENT OF WALTER SLOCOMBE, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman and Senator Lugar. I appreciate the opportunity to come with Ambassador Talbott to talk to you on the topic of Ukraine, a country very much on the mind of the Clinton administration and on the Department of Defense.

As he said, Ambassador Talbott led a Presidential mission to Kiev in early May, and Secretary Aspin just returned from the first visit ever by a U.S. Secretary of Defense to an independent Ukraine. These trips mark a major step in U.S.-Ukraine relations.

Rather than repeat the slightly different words embodied in my statement, the overall view of our relations with Ukraine which Ambassador Talbott has very well summarized in his own statement, I want to talk about the development of the defense and security components of U.S. policy toward Ukraine in light of Secretary Aspin's recent trip on which I had the honor to accompany him.

The recognition of our interests in an independent Ukraine, together with our interest in the success of reform in Russia and the implementation of the START Treaties, form the basis of our approach to obtain Ukrainian ratification and implementation of its obligations under the Lisbon protocol, and also of our efforts to build a security relationship with Ukraine.

We continue to endorse the proposition that all nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms on Ukrainian soil should be eliminated and that Ukraine should be a nonnuclear state, and that Ukraine has freely obligated itself to accomplish these results. We must continue to make this clear.

But parallel to this message, we have adopted an approach which acknowledges Ukraine's legitimate security concerns, to which you referred in your opening statement, stressing that Kiev's real security lies in taking its rightful place in Europe, in the West, and in fashioning good relations with its largest neighbor, Russia.

Equally important will be U.S. appreciation for Ukraine as an important and independent Eastern European State in itself, and as a state which can help us achieve some of our goals related to Russia. These things taken together form the basis for reaching all our objectives in the region and with respect to Ukraine, especially the nuclear ones.

Let me say a few words about the state of play with respect to denuclearization objectives. The administration and the Defense Department, like the members of this committee, I believe, has many questions and indeed concerns about Ukraine's continuing nuclear debate. We have expressed those concerns. When Secretary Aspin was in Kiev, executive branch officials with whom we met,

including President Kravchuk, reiterated Ukraine's commitment to start ratification and fulfillment of Ukraine's Lisbon protocol obligations.

Parliamentary leaders with whom we spoke, however, did not shy from the fact that there are different views in the Rada. Some of the members advocate the retention for a greater or lesser period of time of nuclear weapons. We are, in our contacts, working hard to stress with our audience, particularly these deputies and these voices in Ukraine, that nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory will not enhance but will directly detract from Ukrainian security in the long run, quite apart from the cost to Ukraine of repudiating its commitments undertaken in the Lisbon protocol.

There are certain parliamentary realities, however. I believe, Senator, the last time I had the opportunity to speak to you and your colleagues from this table was in connection with the ratification of the START II agreement. So the proposition that there are parliamentary difficulties in approving already negotiated international obligations is not entirely a surprise to any of us.

The continuing debate in Ukraine suggests that our goal of denuclearization will require innovative approaches. Thus, our new initiative to begin the process of weapons deactivation even before the entry into force of START I. Ambassador Talbott and Secretary Aspin discussed this with their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts during their trips last month, and these discussions are continuing.

Our initiative is to begin deactivation of some strategic forces in Ukraine and to temporarily store the nuclear warheads in Ukraine until they are shipped to Russian dismantlement facilities. This reflects an understanding that the denuclearization process in Ukraine will necessarily unfold in a step by step manner. And to further help move along the process, we are committed and prepared to address Ukraine's underlying security problems.

These U.S. initiatives, advanced by Secretary Aspin in his June trip to Kiev, are based on an understanding that denuclearization in Ukraine will, as you said, be closely tied to Ukraine's underlying security situation, particularly vis-a-vis Russia.

In the rest of my statement I would like to describe to you our overall view of the defense and security aspects of our new policy toward Ukraine. The policy is designed to, "turn the page in our relationship and move ahead." These policies reflect the broad set of interests we have in Ukraine which have been described by Ambassador Talbott. They seek to respond to a broad set of unresolved issues that continue to divide Ukraine and Russia.

In Kiev, Secretary Aspin articulated four key elements of our new approach to Ukraine from a security point of view. The first key element is the strong political relationship we are developing with Ukraine, symbolized by the architecture of agreements we have and will reach in the future.

The second is our willingness to use our good offices to facilitate agreement between Russia and Ukraine where that can be useful and acceptable to both sides.

The third is the development of close ties between the American and the Ukrainian military and defense establishments.

The fourth is specific technical assistance we can provide to help the Ukraine develop effective conventional forces.

These four elements form the basis for stronger security and defense relationships between our two countries. I want to speak about each very briefly.

With respect to U.S.-Ukrainian political ties, Ambassador Talbott has already described for you the steps we have taken in general. We are working on an architecture of agreements and charters which would reiterate U.S. support for Ukrainian independence and establish a strong diplomatic foundation for future U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation.

Our own efforts at the Department of Defense in this connection include ongoing negotiations for a U.S.-Ukrainian memorandum of understanding that would describe the purposes and nature of future defense contacts, including regular meetings between senior defense and military officials.

Senator BIDEN. Contacts or obligations?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Contacts.

With respect to good offices, as Ambassador Talbott has said, the United States is prepared to engage in more confidence-building measures between Ukraine and Russia, including, where appropriate, offering our good offices to facilitate agreement. Specifically, we have discussed the accelerated deactivation of strategic forces which I have mentioned briefly. We are also continuing to work with both countries to resolve the issue of a fair distribution of the proceeds from the sale of highly enriched uranium.

We continue to work with both capitals on the problem of security assurances for Ukraine. We are, in that connection and responding to the implication of your question, very conscious of limits on what the United States can properly do. We are prepared to use our good offices in other areas where both sides believe we could be of assistance.

With respect to the third area, which is ties between the defense establishments, the United States is ready, as Secretary Aspin made clear in his meetings with Ukrainian Defense Minister Morozov, to move forward with the establishment of such ties. Secretary Aspin invited the Minister of Defense to Washington and he has accepted. The dates for these visits are still being discussed. We hope it will be over the course of the summer.

Secretary Aspin also proposed the establishment of a bilateral working group on defense matters, an instrumentality we have established with a number of the former Warsaw Pact countries.

He laid out a series of specific initiatives in the area of defense conversion, budgets, military education, English language training for military officers, and other areas where the United States can be helpful to the Ukrainian military.

And finally, with respect to technical assistance for Ukrainian conventional forces, Ukraine is constructing its national military on the basis, necessarily, of what it inherited in the U.S.S.R. This is an inheritance not simply of equipment, structures, and procedures, but of conflicting loyalties. Minister Morozov has moved decisively and humanely to restructure officer training and fashion effective Ukrainian forces. We want to help within the limits of what is possible.

We are asking Ukraine to become a nonnuclear state, and we certainly must recognize its requirement, a legitimate requirement, for conventional military forces adequate to their needs. While grant military aid is not in prospect, Secretary Aspin told Minister of Defense Morozov that the United States is prepared to help in a number of practical areas, including personnel reform, military education and training, and conventional force planning and development.

These four elements taken together form the basis of what we hope will be a new and fruitful defense and security relationship with Ukraine. It is on the basis of these elements that we intend to proceed to support the Government's broader efforts to obtain the denuclearization objectives we all seek while creating new trust and cooperation between the United States and an independent Ukraine.

I look forward to dealing with your questions, sir.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Slocombe follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MR. SLOCOMBE

Mr. Chairman and Distinguished Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity to address you this afternoon on the topic of Ukraine—a country very much on the mind of the Clinton Administration. As you are already aware, Ambassador Talbott led a Presidential Mission to Kiev in early May and Secretary Aspin just returned from the first ever visit by a U.S. Secretary of Defense to an independent Ukraine. These trips marked a major step in U.S.-Ukraine relations.

I welcome this opportunity to describe the development of the defense and security components of U.S. policy toward Ukraine, in light of Secretary Aspin's recent trip, on which I had the honor to accompany him.

1.

Mr. Chairman, as you well know, over the past 5 years we have witnessed an unprecedented transformation of the European security environment, first in the revolutions that brought democratic reform and full sovereignty to the states of Eastern and Central Europe, and then in the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. This collapse brought 15 new states onto the scene, including the reappearance of the nation of Ukraine.

The United States has important interests in this region. In discussing these interests, three objectives are of overwhelming importance to the United States: (1) the success of President Yeltsin's reforms in Russia and (2) the denuclearization of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, and the reduction, in parallel with our own START reductions, and (3) the reduction of Russian nuclear forces to START II levels. President Clinton's leadership in the support of reform in Russia and Congress's passage of the Nunn-Lugar legislation to provide material support for denuclearization in the former Soviet Union are two examples of how we have pursued these objectives with vigor and imagination.

But the U.S. has another important interest in the region that compliments these three. That interest is our stake in an independent and democratic Ukraine. President Clinton, Secretary Aspin and Ambassador Talbott have carried a new and clear message to Kiev: the United States has an interest in an independent Ukraine, a Ukraine at peace with its neighbors within internationally recognized borders, democratic, and pursuing political and economic reform at home. This interest in no way alters our view that Ukraine should be—for its own sake as well as ours and everyone else's—a non-nuclear state.

First and foremost, an independent Ukraine is important not just as the largest European state outside Russia but as a key element in the stability of the East Central European and Black Sea regions. Poland has made a special effort to establish strong bilateral relations with Ukraine. Officials from the Central European countries have repeated that an independent Kiev is important for the stability of the states of Central and Eastern Europe. A similar observation could be made concerning the Black Sea region.

Of course Ukraine is also important because it lies between Russia and much of Central Europe. But we do not believe that Ukraine or Poland or any other state

of the region should play the role of buffer state or of part of a new cordon sanitaire. Nor do we want, or foresee, a Europe in which buffer states are needed. We want Ukraine and the other independent states of the region to have an independent national life.

There need be no conflict between these goals and Russian interests. As a practical matter the best assurance of stability is success for reform in Russia. We want these states to have good relations with all their neighbors; indeed, good relations between Russia and Ukraine are one of the keys to long term stability in the region. President Kravchuk has recognized this in defining the need for balance in Ukrainian policy:

"We must integrate ourselves into Europe, and with other countries, where there is leading technology, leading science. But to interrupt relations, let us say, with Russia, would be not only irrational but dangerous. By the way, we should work with Russia as equal partners, as two independent states. We are neighbors and must live together on this planet, live and cooperate."

It is this vision of cooperation between independent states that is of central concern to the United States.

The U.S. also has trade and economic interests in the Central/Eastern European region which will be best furthered by the success of reform and the flourishing of independence in Ukraine, in Russia and throughout the region. The collapse of the U.S.S.R. has emancipated the talented, highly trained people of Ukraine—and indeed, of Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union. The Ukrainian government, however, has taken only cautious, halting steps toward economic reform. We are encouraging them to take more, precisely because the greatest possibilities for economic cooperation between our two nations will come as the Ukrainian private sector is freed from the fetters of the past. Political and economic reforms will attract the great engines of change: private business and investors, the market and resource allocation through the market, and the energies of a work force that realizes that it can share in the fruits of a free economy.

II.

The recognition of our interests in an independent Ukraine, together with our interests in the success of reform in Russia and the implementation of the START Treaties, form the basis of our approach to obtain Ukrainian ratification and implementation of its obligations under the Lisbon Protocol. The Clinton Administration fully endorses the proposition that all nuclear weapons and deployed strategic offensive arms on Ukrainian soil should be eliminated and that Ukraine should be a non-nuclear state—and that Ukraine has freely obligated itself to accomplish these results. We must continue to make it clear that we are serious about holding Ukraine accountable to its international commitments.

Parallel to this message, however, we have adopted an approach which acknowledges Ukraine's legitimate security concerns, while stressing that Kiev's real security lies in taking its rightful place in Europe, in the West, and in fashioning good relations with its largest neighbor, Russia. Equally important will be U.S. appreciation for Ukraine as an important and independent East European state, and as a state which could help us to achieve some of our goals related to Russia. It is these things taken together that will provide the basis for reaching all our objectives in the region, especially the nuclear ones.

The Clinton Administration, like the members of this Committee, has many questions, and, indeed, concerns, about Ukraine's continuing nuclear debate. We have expressed growing concern about Ukraine's overall intentions with regard to START and NPT. When Secretary Aspin was in Kiev, the executive branch officials with whom he met, including President Kravchuk, reiterated Ukraine's commitment to START ratification and fulfillment of Ukraine's Lisbon Protocol obligations. The parliamentary leaders with whom he spoke did not shy from the fact that there are different views in the Rada—some of the members advocate the retention, for a greater or lesser period of time, of the nuclear weapons. We are working hard to stress to these deputies that nuclear weapons on Ukrainian territory will not enhance, but directly detract from Ukrainian security, quite apart from the costs to Ukraine of repudiating its commitments undertaken in the Lisbon protocol.

There are certain parliamentary realities, however. The continuing debate in Ukraine suggests that achieving our goal of denuclearization requires innovative approaches. Thus our new initiative to begin the process of weapons deactivation even before entry into force of START I. Ambassador Talbott and Secretary Aspin discussed this with their Ukrainian and Russian counterparts during their trips last month, and these discussions are continuing. I would be happy to provide more details on this proposal in executive session.

Our initiative to begin deactivation of some strategic forces in Ukraine, and to temporarily store the nuclear warheads in Ukraine until they are shipped to Russian dismantlement facilities, reflects an understanding that the denuclearization process in Ukraine will unfold in a step-by-step manner. And to further help move along the denuclearization process, we are committed and prepared to address Ukraine's underlying security problems. Thus, we have been working to develop, along with Russia and the U.K., security assurances which would be acceptable to Ukraine and consistent with U.S. interests.

The U.S. initiatives, endorsed by Secretary Aspin on his June trip to Kiev, are based on an understanding that denuclearization in Ukraine will be closely tied to Ukraine's underlying security concerns, particularly vis-a-vis Russia. In the balance of my statement I would like to describe for you the defense and security aspects of our new policies toward Ukraine, policies designed to "turn the page" in our relationship and to move ahead in the destruction and dismantlement of the Soviet nuclear weapons and their delivery systems that remain on the territory of Ukraine. These policies reflect the broad set of interests I described at the outset and seek to respond to the broad set of unresolved issues that continue to divide Ukraine and Russia.

III.

In Kiev, Secretary Aspin articulated four key elements of our new approach to Ukraine—an approach which recognizes that Ukraine faces economic, political and security challenges and will require some assistance in meeting these challenges:

- The first key element is the strong political relationship we are developing with Ukraine, symbolized by the architecture of agreements we have and will reach in the near future.
- The second is our willingness to use our good offices to facilitate agreement between Russia and Ukraine.
- The third is the development of close ties between the American and Ukrainian military and defense establishments.
- And the fourth is specific technical assistance we can provide to help the Ukrainians develop effective conventional forces.

These four elements form the basis for stronger security and defense relations between our countries, and I would like to speak about each in greater detail.

1. *U.S.-Ukrainian Political Ties.*—Ambassador Talbott has described for you the steps we have taken to improve our political ties with Ukraine, including the formation of a forum for strategic dialogue led by Ambassador Talbott and chaired on the Ukrainian side by Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk. We are also working on an architecture of agreements and charters which will reiterate U.S. support for Ukrainian independence and establish a strong diplomatic foundation for future U.S.-Ukrainian cooperation. We are also working with Ukraine in important international fora, such as the UN, CSCE and NACC. Our own efforts at the Department of Defense include ongoing negotiations for a U.S.-Ukrainian Memorandum of Understanding that would describe purposes and nature of future defense contacts, including regular meetings between senior defense and military officials.

2. *Good Offices to Facilitate Russo-Ukrainian Differences.*—As Ambassador Talbott has said, the United States is prepared to engage in more confidence building measures between Ukraine and Russia, including, where appropriate, offering our good offices to facilitate Russo-Ukrainian agreement. We recognize that Ukrainian-Russian tensions could have a profoundly chilling effect on the whole of Europe. Suspensions in both capitals continue to have adverse effects on the fulfillment of the Lisbon Accords.

- Ambassador Talbott and Secretary Aspin discussed with our Russian and Ukrainian interlocutors how we might begin the process of the accelerated deactivation of strategic forces before entry into force of START I. These discussions will continue.
- We are also continuing to work with both Moscow and Kiev to resolve the issue concerning a fair distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the highly enriched uranium. We are seeking to ensure that all parties to Lisbon receive a fair share of the HEU proceeds.
- We continue to work with both capitals on the problem of security assurances for Ukraine.
- And we are prepared to use our good offices in other areas, where both sides believe we could be of assistance.

3. *Development of Close Ties Between the American and Ukrainian Military and Defense Establishments.*—As Secretary Aspin made plain to Ukrainian Minister of Defense Morozov, the United States is ready to move forward with the establishment of closer ties between the Ukrainian and American militaries and defense min-

istries. Secretary Aspin invited MoD Morozov to Washington, and Minister Morozov has accepted. The dates of the visit are still being discussed, but both sides are aiming for the end of July. Secretary Aspin also proposed the establishment of a Bilateral Working Group on Defense Matters. He laid out a series of initiatives in defense conversion, budgets, military education, English language training and other areas where the U.S. can help the Ukrainian military.

4. *Technical Assistance for Ukrainian Conventional Forces.*—Ukraine is constructing its national military, particularly its conventional forces, on the basis of what it inherited from the U.S.S.R. This is an inheritance, not simply of equipment and structures, but of conflicting loyalties as well. Minister Morozov has moved decisively and humanely to restructure officer training and fashion effective Ukrainian forces. We want to help. If we are asking Ukraine to become a non-nuclear state, we certainly must recognize its requirement for conventional military forces of a quantity and quality adequate to their legitimate needs. While grant military aid is not in prospect, Secretary Aspin told MoD Morozov in Kiev that the U.S. was prepared to help in the areas of personnel reform, military education and training, and conventional force planning and development.

Mr. Chairman, these four elements taken together form the basis of our defense and security relationship with Ukraine. It is on the basis of these elements that we intend to proceed to obtain the denuclearization objectives we all seek, while creating new trust and cooperation between the United States and an independent Ukraine.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Let me begin, and I would invite my colleague to interrupt.

Senator LUGAR. All right.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Secretary, there have been varying reports in the media, both here and in Central Europe, about the nuclear weapons that remain on Ukrainian soil. I recognize that you cannot answer some questions that I have in open session, but I would like to get as much information as possible on the table so the American public can understand what we believe to be at stake here.

What is your understanding of how many strategic weapons remain on Ukrainian soil?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There are 136 SS-19 launchers in Ukraine, and there are 46 SS-24 mobile launchers in Ukraine.

Senator BIDEN. With multiple warheads on each of those?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I used to have those figures in my head. Let us get them right.

Senator BIDEN. I think it is 6 and 10, but I am not sure.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I believe that is it. It is certainly 10 on the SS-24's. And in addition, there are some bombers still remaining in Ukraine, which we assume—well, there is no question that they have nuclear weapons associated with them. The exact character and numbers we are not certain of, and certainly, the details I would have to do in executive session.

Senator BIDEN. Are there any tactical weapons left?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. They have all been withdrawn in accordance with the obligations that were undertaken earlier on.

Senator BIDEN. Now, are the SS-24's and SS-19's that we are aware of still in place? Are any of them still targeted on the United States?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Well, we do not know exactly where they are targeted.

Senator BIDEN. We have no reason to believe the targeting has changed, do we?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We have no reason to believe the targeting has changed.

Senator BIDEN. And to the best of our knowledge, they were targeted on us?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. They were target on the United States. As a technical matter, some of them may well be targeted on Western Europe, but that is another issue.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, on Western Europe. Now, do we know which forces are physically guarding the nuclear weapons facilities? Are they Ukrainian forces?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It depends. Let me answer that this way in open session. We believe that the basic prechange command structure is essentially still in place. That is that the people who are in the launch control facilities who do the day-to-day support, care, and feeding of the missiles, report to a central authority in Moscow.

Some of those officers and soldiers have taken oaths to the Ukrainian State. In addition, the basic army in the Ukraine is, of course, now a Ukrainian Army, and the facilities are, in some sense, guarded—in perhaps two senses of the word guard—from the inside and outside, by those forces.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that confuses people who approach me, including some of my colleagues, and maybe Senator Lugar has had the same experience, is a discussion about nuclear weapons in Ukraine in terms of the practical question of who, if they decide to launch one, has the power, the physical power, to do so?

My understanding, from having been educated by you years ago on such matters, is that there is a requirement to have launch codes. Without those codes, you have to come up with an entirely new approach and system that allows you to control that weaponry and actually activate it.

One of the things that I think is important for us to understand is, who controls those codes? Am I correct in my understanding that one needs a launch code in order to set the devil off. And if that is correct, who has those codes, to the best of our knowledge?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As I said, to the best of our knowledge, the command system is centralized in Moscow.

Senator BIDEN. By command system, we mean those with the capability to launch a missile?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. To go beyond saying that we believe that the system that was in place before and which is centered in Moscow continues to be in place, I do not think I can go beyond that in open session.

I should say, and it is a fundamental point, that Ukrainian officials deny, and we have no reason whatever to challenge this, that their objective is—they do not seek operational control, the ability to launch the weapon. They do seek what they call administrative control.

Senator BIDEN. And what do they mean by that?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As near as we can figure out, what they mean by administrative control is they pick the officers, they own the physical objects which are in Ukraine. The Ukrainian flag, in their view, should fly over the installation. That kind of thing.

Senator BIDEN. Is that a distinction? With or without a difference, in terms of being able to make them fly?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. We understand it to be, and we believe it is, a distinction with an important difference, that it is the difference between having the loyalty and the ownership claim. Ownership appears to be a big issue to both sides, with respect to these weapons, the distinction between ownership and the ability to fire the weapons.

One of the consistent themes of the Ukrainian officers whom we spoke to was, to go back to your question about who they are targeted on, they do not want these weapons targeted on anybody.

Senator BIDEN. Which gets me to the second point. As we try to flesh out what is at stake here in terms of the possession of and ultimately the control of these weapons, you made reference in your statement that you believe Ukrainian security is not enhanced by accommodating the desire of some within the Parliament for administrative control over nuclear weaponry. That does not enhance their power.

My recollection is that the SS-24's and SS-19's were designed to fly distances that exceed what would be necessary for Ukraine to use them against Russia. So in fact, they are not the most useful weapons to act as a deterrent against Russia.

If Ukraine were to gain positive operational control of the ICBM's on its soil, the question seems to be whether those weapons would have sufficient value to the Ukrainians. There remains a question about whether these long-range ICBM's could be launched at any targets in Russia other than the Russian Far East. Can you comment on this issue?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Let me put it this way: On the purely hypothetical assumption that they were under real effective operational general control of Ukraine, I would not bet the farm on the proposition that they could not hit a lot of interesting targets, including those much closer than eastern Siberia.

Senator BIDEN. In other words, you are saying that you think they could?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. There is, as you are alluding to, there is a controversy over the minimum range of the missiles as they are now configured. That is a controversy of some important technical interest, and in the short term it might have some inhibition on the flexibility of targeting.

I think the reasons that acquiring nuclear weapons for Ukraine or acquiring a nuclear force for Ukraine is not in Ukraine's security interest, does not have centrally to do with any limitations real or supposed on the capacity of those weapons. It has more to do with two problems.

One is the fundamental one of the kind of relationship Ukraine is going to have with Russia in the long term. If that relationship is going to be one to which nuclear weapons would be relevant, Ukraine is in a bad way anyway. That is, if they assume a relationship of a kind of unrelenting hostility to which nuclear weapons are relevant as a source of deterrence, the kind of relationship we had with Russia during—with the Soviet Union during the cold war, then their security is not in very good shape anyway.

The second is the problem of getting from here to there.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think it is probably true that if you assume essentially unlimited resources, unlimited access, and unlimited time, almost all technical problems can, as a theoretical matter can be overcome. But the assumption of unlimited access and unlimited time and unlimited resources are none of them true. There is a serious problem about what the Russians would do if they saw Ukraine moving toward not simply arguments about flying flags and who signs paychecks and stuff like that, but about really trying to build a nuclear force. That would create, to put it mildly, a short-term problem about the relations between Russia and Ukraine which would be pretty serious for everybody.

Senator BIDEN. Well, let me conclude my round here with a question for the Ambassador. It seems to me, Mr. Ambassador, there may be two reasons why our argument for Ukrainian denuclearization is weakened by the collective and individual behavior of the West and the United States.

One is that the West, acting in what I consider to be pathetic abandonment of the principle of collective security and of the U.S. Security Council resolution on Bosnia, could not offer assurances to the Ukrainian Government that might give them a sense of security. The Security Council has not done itself proud thus far, and some of the same principles are at stake.

As you have indicated in the past, President Yeltsin has a problem not only with the former apparatchiks, the reds, but the browns. And the browns are very concerned about Russians who live outside of the border of Russia, of whom a significant number live in Ukraine. And the principle that we have, as a Nation and as the Western world, to be established in Bosnia—is that the world will not act to stop the inappropriate behavior of uniting and defining nationhood based on race and ethnicity, which is exactly what has happened in Bosnia. I would not think that would allow you to be very well received when you attempt to muster assurances that the U.N. Security Council might play a part in assuring Ukrainian security.

Second, the apparent plan of the administration to continue with nuclear testing, seems to me to runs counter to the effort that I believe we should be making to minimize the role of nuclear weapons as the currency for international power.

I wonder if you could comment on whether or not any of your counterparts have raised either of those questions with you as you attempt to work out security assurances for Ukraine in response to their concern about Russian aggression in the past and in the future?

Ambassador TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman, it is certainly the case that the former Yugoslavia is very much on the minds of citizens of the states that make up the former Soviet Union. They can see every bit as clearly as we can, and I would suggest, perhaps, even more clearly than we can, the lessons that the horror and tragedy in Yugoslavia hold for the rest of the world and particularly for a very large country which was under Communist rule for a long time, a multiethnic Communist state that has now broken up into independent states.

The lesson that they derive and that we certainly feel they should derive is that it is exceedingly important that the principles

of sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity be observed by all the states in the region; that the United States, as a global leader, do what it can to reinforce those principles. And another lesson, of course, that we hope very much they are learning, and many of our interlocutors indicate they have studied closely, is the importance of observing the rights of all nationality groups within the borders of these new states.

On the question of nuclear testing, as you know, of course, Mr. Chairman, the Clinton administration has not yet announced a decision on this. But when that decision is made, I am confident that it will reflect a careful balance between our nonproliferation goals and the risk of relying on our nuclear deterrence without being able to test if there is deemed to be such a risk. I do not want to prejudice or hint a prediction which I am not making of what the decision will be.

But, having mentioned nonproliferation, let me just add an additional point. It really echoes and reinforces one that Mr. Slocombe made. And that is that a strong argument for a nonnuclear Ukraine is that there is, indeed, a global issue here. And the global issue is the future of the Nonproliferation Treaty and the nonproliferation regime.

It is our concern that if Ukraine, contrary to the assurances we repeatedly, and indeed recently, have from its leadership, were to try to become a nuclear weapons state, that would put under great stress, and indeed, in jeopardy, the Nonproliferation Treaty. There would be implications throughout the region and throughout the world, which would be adverse to the interests of the Ukraine itself, as well as to other states in the region.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. Senator Lugar.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador Talbott and Secretary Slocombe, I want to take this opportunity also to just bring up to speed on the record how things are going with the highly enriched uranium negotiations. You touched upon that, Ambassador Talbott, in your testimony. But just as background for this, in my visitation with Ukrainians, they, at first, of course, cooperated readily, and we are grateful that that was the case, to ship tactical nuclear weapons into Russia, into the storage situations that are there now. And some of those weapons were in the process of being destroyed, and the highly enriched uranium extracted from them.

Now, the agreement that the United States proposed to Russia was to purchase all of the highly enriched uranium from the destruction of the tactical weapons and hopefully from the strategic weapons as they are destroyed, and to work out a revenue-sharing agreement with Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. And the agreement could be a lucrative one for all four states. And some would point out that, given the struggles that we have had to think of ways in which moneys could be available to those four states in a timely way as well as over time, this particular agreement offers as much promise as almost anything else that we might be doing.

The problem has been the lack of agreement between the four states as to what the revenue-sharing principle ought to be, as well as the continuation of our own negotiations in the Department of

Energy with Russia over the price and the terms, which are important.

At some point, as much as \$7 billion has been mentioned over a course of 20 years. So it is an agreement of some consequence.

Now, I would just add that most people in the United States are vaguely aware of this negotiation, but most of my constituencies, as I have discussed it, are surprised both in terms of the magnitude, as well as the possibilities; namely, that all the highly enriched uranium from these weapons might come from Russia to the United States, be natured and be used by our energy companies in a private way in the United States to provide energy.

All I want, I suppose, today is to bring everyone up to date on how all of this stands. Because, clearly, because of the dollar amounts involved for the United States, plus the other four, as well as the technical arrangements of revenue sharing and the diplomacy involved, it is complex but important to bring on the record.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Thank you very much, Senator. I will try to be responsive to your question.

If you and the chairman would permit, I have a colleague with me today who, since we have an extra chair and microphone, maybe you would be kind enough to let him join me at the witness table.

Senator BIDEN. Surely.

Ambassador TALBOTT. This is Dr. Eric Edelman, my deputy responsible for these and, indeed, other matters. I suspect also that Mr. Slocombe will have something to say on this subject. But, before getting into further detail, let me make two general observations.

First of all, let me take advantage of the fact that you did mention the two other republics of the former Soviet Union that have or have had strategic nuclear weapons on their territory, and just say a couple of words about them. That is, Kazakhstan and Belarus. Kazakhstan, which Dr. Edelman and I visited in the course of our recent trip, has already ratified the START I Treaty. And the President of Kazakhstan, Mr. Nazarbayev, assured us that the Parliament of Kazakhstan will accede to the Nonproliferation Treaty this fall, which, of course, is very heartening.

Belarus is even further along in the direction that we feel serves its interests, as well as the regions and, indeed, the globe. It has ratified START I, acceded to the Nonproliferation Treaty, and we hope in the near future will deposit the instruments of accession to the Nonproliferation Treaty with the signatory states. And the head of state of Belarus, Mr. Shushkevich, will be in Washington shortly for meetings at the highest level of this Government.

You put the question to me about highly enriched uranium so succinctly and so comprehensively, I really think there is not a whole lot more for me to say except that I agree entirely with what you say. There are major economic benefits for all of the states that we are talking about here. And these are states, after all, which are desperately in need of hard currency.

I have to be somewhat circumspect, among other things, because I was speaking in the future tense here, but my impression is that significant progress has been made recently toward an agreement on the pricing and the sharing of the profits from the HEU. And

one point that we have made in our contacts with all of the parties is that this is a huge benefit to them, and it should constitute a big incentive for them to come to agreement.

And, of course, because it is our money, Senator, that is involved here, we very much have a place at the table in these discussions.

Dr. EDELMAN. Senator, I would only add two things to what Ambassador Talbott has already just said, which are that there are two encouraging signs that I think we have seen, both in our discussions and publicly, with various parties. One is that all the sides appear to now realize what you articulated so well in your question, which is that there are immense benefits to moving forward with an agreement. They now seem to have taken that on board and are factoring that into their own discussions.

The second is that in the press conference after the Kravchuk-Yeltsin summit, President Kravchuk said that he had obtained from President Yeltsin recognition by Russia of Ukraine's right to get the economic benefit from the HEU in the weapons that would be removed from Ukrainian territory and dismantled.

So I think those are both positive and encouraging signs on that score.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Well, that certainly is a positive sign, that press conference. It just seems to me that throughout Ukraine, officials have known about the revenue-sharing thing, but not understood the enormity of it. I can remember in conversations Senator Nunn and I had with President Kravchuk at a press conference that he called in his office in an impromptu way after our meeting. He stressed, because he, himself, I think, had made a discovery of the potential enormity of what is involved, I do not know what the percentage for Ukraine will be, whether it will be 10 percent or 15 percent or what have you, but if you are talking about \$7 billion, this comes to \$1 billion. This is substantially more money than has been discussed in any agreement or economic situation.

And, as Ambassador Talbott said, it is our money. But the accounting for this, as I understand it, is the Department of Energy will be able to make sales to private industry in this country, so it becomes a wash. That is an important factor, likewise. It is not an outlay of foreign assistance in a different guise. This becomes a commercial transaction, although one of great strategic and safety significance to the world.

Now, the other problem, it would seem to me, is that President Kravchuk, as well as President Nazarbayev, and to some extent the Belarussians, felt that in the urgency to move all the tactical weapons to Russia, which we certainly encouraged and which was in their best interest, I believe, that they sometimes feel that they have been had. That somehow something happened there, something of value escaped them.

And one of the problems seems to be in addition to the strategic interests of some officials in those countries that wanted to retain nuclear weapons, there is a lingering thought that somehow they have not received value for what they gave up, and are looking for value for whatever remains.

Now, there are, as I am certain all of you who have visited Ukraine have found, persons who really do not believe in their

heart of hearts that nuclear weapons are of great value to the country, but they believe they have something of value. And they want us to recognize that. And this is why I underline again, and I compliment you on moving along, this agreement. Because, it seems to me, that it speaks to several questions that are outstanding in terms of the confidence the Ukraine or Belarus or Kazakhstan has in us as a good party in trying to facilitate something that was of benefit to everyone, as well as to the world at a time of near anarchy in some portions of the Soviet Union as the independence movement occurred and the Red army was less stable.

So I appreciate this opportunity simply to underline again the importance of this.

I have no further questions, and Senator Biden, our chairman, will be returning from voting, and I shall need to leave to do my duty. So, for the moment, I will call a temporary recess, probably for no more than 3 or 5 minutes, and then the hearing will continue.

[A brief recess was taken.]

Senator BIDEN [presiding]. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Ambassador, as you and the President and the Secretary of Defense have indicated time and again, we believe that Ukraine should live up to its commitment made in the Lisbon protocol to ratify the START Treaty and to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonnuclear state.

The implication is that the Ukrainian Constitution and present form of government works the same way ours does. For the record, can any of you tell me whether or not there is a requirement under Ukrainian law that the Parliament ratify the agreement made and signed in Lisbon by the Ukrainian Government officials? To the best of my knowledge, there is no such requirement, but there may be. Is there a legal requirement under the existing mechanisms?

And if you do not know the answer now, I would appreciate if you could submit it in writing for the record.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. One of the things I learned in practice was not to quote statutes from memory. I will check my recollection of the Ukrainian Constitution and we will give you an answer for the record.

Senator BIDEN. I do not know the answer. That is why I am asking you the question. I should, but I do not.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Maybe one of my colleagues knows the answer.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Having not been in legal practice, I am perhaps more reckless, but my impression is certainly the same, Mr. Chairman. This is a matter of parliamentary prerogative, which the Parliament, the Rada, has not chosen to exercise yet. And our hope is, of course, that it will. And the assurances we have from the executive branch, which is the branch of the Ukrainian Government with which we have direct dealings and with which we negotiate, that the executive branch continues to assure us that even in this time of some political unsettlement in Ukraine, they are confident that ratification and accession will be forthcoming.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Senator, could I comment a little more on that?

Senator BIDEN. Please.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. My understanding of the position of the previous administration and of this is that obligations that were assumed in the Lisbon protocol are obligations of Ukraine as a state and are not subject to whatever the process under Ukrainian law and constitutional practice for ratification—are not subject to that process. It is an international obligation of Ukraine to meet its obligations under the Lisbon protocol.

Senator BIDEN. That is my understanding, as well. But, as you and I both know, our Constitution preempts any international law if in fact it is not otherwise authorized.

You are shaking your head no? That one I am certain of. The executive cannot bind the United States by treaty, absent adhering to the constitutional requirements under our system of separated powers to do so.

I am wondering whether or not the same thing exists over there.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. That is the point we will track for you.

Senator BIDEN. Without predicting the outcome, Mr. Ambassador, of parliamentary debate in Ukraine, could you describe the various streams of opinion that exist in the Ukrainian Government and Parliament, both executive and legislative branches, about what they should or should not do? Can you tell us a little bit about the debate in Ukraine and in the Ukrainian Parliament regarding the commitment made in the Lisbon protocol?

Ambassador TALBOTT. Yes, I will try to do that, Mr. Chairman.

If you would permit, perhaps, if I have satisfied you in my attempt to answer that question, I would like to put in the record of these proceedings a response to a question that Senator Lugar put to us before he had to leave and vote, because it is on an important issue.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, without objection, we will.

Ambassador TALBOTT. All right, I would like to do that.

In two of the three visits that I have made to Kiev in the last month and, indeed, in conversations that I have had with Ukrainian colleagues and visitors here in Washington, and in my study of the fairly voluminous reporting that the Government has made available to me, I have asked myself exactly the question that you are putting to me.

Now, of course, this kind of categorization always runs the risk of oversimplifying a bit, but I will take that risk. I would say that there are basically three views that are reflected in the Parliament.

The first of those views is the one that is closest to our own and the one that Mr. Slocombe and I have tried to articulate here this afternoon. And that is that the national interest of Ukraine militates in favor of prompt and complete fulfillment of the Lisbon protocols. That is, it is not in Ukraine's national interest to aspire to being a nuclear weapons state. And the argumentation for that parallels the argumentation that we have given you here today and that you obviously share.

The second school of thought, as it were, is that eventually these weapons should be dismantled, and they are, over the coming period, going to be a wasting asset. But as long as they are on Ukrainian territory and operational, they have a value in two forms. They represent leverage in the request and, indeed, requirements that many Ukrainians feel for what they call security guar-

antees, what we prefer to call security assurances; and, second, they have monetary value. And perhaps both of these values are going up the longer they hold on to the weapons.

So, to put it very simply, they are holding on to them as bargaining chips.

And then there is a third view, which one hears expressed with particular vociferousness on the part of some Ukrainian parliamentarians with whom Secretary Aspin and I have met. And that is that Ukraine needs nuclear weapons, pure and simple. That it needs nuclear weapons for the classic reasons of deterrence and security. And, obviously, we feel that that view is profoundly mistaken. And our hope, of course, is that it will not prevail.

Senator BIDEN. Well, as you probably know, in the current issue of Foreign Affairs, Prof. John Meerscheimer of the University of Chicago articulates that view, a case for a nuclear-armed Ukraine, which he contends would contribute to a stable balance of power between Russia and Ukraine. For argument's sake, why is that incorrect? And I ask both of you that question.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Yes. To fully answer your question, I would, I think, be a bit redundant. I think the editors of Foreign Affairs balanced Professor Meerscheimer's article with another piece by an equally respected academic expert on these matters, Prof. Steven Miller, who does make the counterargument. And the counterargument basically reflects what Mr. Slocombe and I have argued here. And that is that the retention of nuclear weapons would have a highly provocative and unsettling and destabilizing effect on the region. It would jeopardize the arms control regime.

Senator BIDEN. Why would it have a destabilizing effect? I agree with you fully, but I think we should explain for the record why it would have such a provocative and destabilizing effect.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Well, let us go back to the basics of the recent past here. An extraordinary thing happened on Christmas Day 1991. And that is this Leviathan, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ceased to exist. It was a giant state, musclebound, and a very unhappy state in many ways. So unhappy that it died, as such. But it died very suddenly. And it left bits and pieces, as it were, the detritus of empire all over its own territory. And that took various forms.

It took the form of Soviet military units who were stationed outside of Russia proper and who were not welcome among the citizens of the non-Russian new independent states. And that of course has also been a difficult issue, both for the Russian Government and for the American Government. But perhaps the most serious and dangerous pieces of empire left strewn all over that vast part of the map were the nuclear weapons.

While you were away, Senator Lugar referred to the tactical nuclear weapons which were in various republics. There were strategic nuclear weapons in four of the republics, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine. The proposition was quickly established and agreed to by all parties—and that is something that I stress here—that while there were to be 15 successor states to the old Soviet Union—and of course we put the three Baltic States in a special category because we have never acknowledged that they were legitimately part of the Soviet Union—that while there were sud-

denly 15 truly free and independent states, there was only to be one nuclear-armed country among them, and that was Russia.

The argumentation for that was that if the breakup of the Soviet Union were to mean that you had four nuclear states where previously you had had one, it would have a very effect on the attempt of the international community to keep nuclear weapons proliferation under control, and also it would exacerbate relations between and among those four states and create instability in the region.

The point I would make in conclusion is that Ukraine itself accepted that proposition when it became a signatory to the Lisbon protocol. And we use the word in this administration "partnership." We want partnership with all of the states of the former Soviet Union, notably including Ukraine. One way we define partnership is a willingness to carry out international commitments. And we think this is a very important test of Ukraine's standing as our new partner.

Senator BIDEN. Mr. Slocombe, do you have any comment?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I confess I have not read the articles, either one of them. But it seems to me, to answer your question, that the problems—we have to look at two aspects. One is assume somehow a steady state in which Ukraine not only is in the process of denuclearizing and asserts various ownership claims and has negative controls of various kinds, but a situation in which they really try to—Ambassador Talbott's third group.

The first thing it does is it would ensure that there would be a hostile relationship between Ukraine and Russia for the reasons that I identified. That is a way of guaranteeing that Ukraine would have the one thing which is most important for it to avoid provoking for itself from the point of view of its relations with Russia, its biggest neighbor.

The second is it would promote proliferation in the area not only of nuclear weapons, but in several ways. It seems to me, at a minimum, it would interfere with Russian reductions. It seems to me it would call into question the whole system of both nuclear and conventional arms control, which is a matter of importance to us, because it is a matter of vital concern to Ukraine.

And, third, just speaking as an analyst, Ukraine would face the familiar problems of deterrence with a small limited-capability nuclear force, facing a potentially overwhelming conventional capability. Ukraine is not—well, in thinking about nonproliferation issues, I like to identify what I call the Masada States, Israel, arguably Taiwan, maybe North Korea, maybe South Korea, that can plausibly make the argument that they face threats to their very national existence which they cannot cope with in any other way, and therefore they will think about getting nuclear weapons.

Taiwan is a good example of a country that could have come erroneously to that conclusion, but sensibly decided not to. North Korea, we have questions of whether they are going to do that.

The Ukraine has a lot of problems, but probably that is not its problem. Small nuclear forces may be OK as an argument that if we go down we will take a couple of million Russians with us. One of the problems about these countries being free countries now is that now every possible opinion is held by somebody in all of these countries on all of these matters. No doubt there are people who

think that is the problem. I do not think even Ukrainians who are understandably very, very skeptical of Russian intentions, think that is quite the issue.

So that, in a sense, if there is a military problem of relationships with Russia, which, probably, from their point of view, there is, a small nuclear force is not the answer to that. I can understand why they might reach other conclusions, but that is the reason I would not reach that conclusion.

And, second, there is, as I said, the fundamental problem that they cannot assume that they would get to the steady state, that they would automatically have a nice, secure, well-tested, well-controlled, well-maintained—of course, there are also issues of cost, whether they are going to get it—force. The process of getting there, of doing all of the various quite complicated things that would be necessary to have a real militarily capable force—I do not want to put words in anybody's mouth, but they would have the most profoundly—they would create the most perverse set of incentives for the Russians in trying to do that.

Senator BIDEN. In the near term?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. In the near term, which might be a period of several years.

Senator BIDEN. Yes.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. It is not 20 minutes or 20 days.

Senator BIDEN. Exactly.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. And, furthermore, it would make vastly more difficult the creation of what is Ukraine's best long-term security assurance, which is building Ukraine into a broader system of a Europe-wide arrangement under which force and the threat of force are not instruments of national policy.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I happen to think you are right, but there are differing opinions, so I think it important to speak to that. The past is prologue. But, as the argument follows, there will never be a time in the foreseeable future when Ukraine can trust Russia not to have aggressive designs on all or parts of Ukraine.

The argument continues from there: Russia is an unstable government. An unstable government, the future of which is unknown. And there is the prospect that the radical nationalists will prevail, and it is a prospect as real as that that potential democratic influence will hopefully prevail.

And, last, there is no ability to rely on the New World Order, because there is none. There is no world order. The United States does not have the backbone to stand up when necessary to maintain or create a New World Order. And the Europeans have a history of never moving in a timely fashion to prevent catastrophe on the continent.

Therefore, the only thing that will keep Ukraine secure while Russia hopefully wobbles toward stability and the world realizes it has to have a more unified approach to issues such as sovereignty, that the only thing that will keep them safe is, to use your phrase, the Masada approach. The Russians will believe, that because of past relationships, Ukraine would use those weapons to keep from ever being again in a situation like they were before. Therefore, it is credible. Therefore, it is a deterrent. Therefore, they should hang

on to them until there is some substantial evidence that there is a New World Order.

That is the rationale I hear.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I am sure that is how the argument goes, and it is an argument which coheres. I think the problem, though, is that it is the right question. It just strikes me that the question for Ukraine, stepping back and looking at it purely analytically, is whether or not the possession of what will necessarily be a relatively small, very expensive and technically uncertain—at least for a long time—nuclear force inherited from the enemy in this picture of the world makes a contribution to Ukrainian security, even under the dire circumstances with which I agree, I suppose Ukrainians have to worry about, weighed against the clear costs to Ukrainian security.

And those costs include—it is a sort of Heisenberg principle—those costs include reinforcing all of the worst tendencies in Russia which the policy is intended to guard against. That, in some sense, may be the strongest single argument.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, sir.

Ambassador TALBOTT. May I also respond?

Senator BIDEN. Please.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Because I realize that you of course were representing one possible view.

Senator BIDEN. It is not a view that I subscribe to. But I think it is an important view to respond to.

Ambassador TALBOTT. I do. I agree. I concur completely with what Mr. Slocombe has said.

Senator BIDEN. It is very important for you to respond, as well.

Ambassador TALBOTT. The argument you have alluded to may cohere internally, but I do not think it corresponds either to reality or to present trends or to the principles guiding the foreign policy of this administration, principles that I think the Congress strongly supports.

First of all, I certainly do not accept the view of Russia that you pose there. I think that while obviously there are many troubles in Russia today and many uncertainties about Russia's future, the overall trend is indeed in the right direction. And there has been some very encouraging momentum in the process of political reform in Russia.

And, on that subject, I would say that, clearly, what happens in Russia matters a great deal to the other former republics of the Soviet Union. That is self-evident. But the converse is also true.

What happens in the other former republics of the Soviet Union matters a lot in its impact on the Russia internal political situation. And in no former republic is that more true than Ukraine, since it is the largest and, of course, has this substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons.

The second point that you relayed with which I would disagree profoundly is of course the proposition that the United States does not have the backbone to play a part in building the New World Order. I would say that now, more than ever, we have an obligation and an opportunity to do so. And it is certainly the intention of this administration to make good on that obligation.

And I would suggest that the policy which Mr. Slocombe and I have been laying out for you and your colleagues here today is an example of how the United States is determined to play a very active leadership role in trying to deal with the difficult consequences of what was basically a miraculous event, and that is the end of Soviet communism.

The third point with which I would disagree is the notion that the New World Order will be more orderly if it is the nuclear age version of the law of the jungle, which is implicit, I think, in that view.

And, finally, is the notion that Russian fear of Ukrainian nuclear weapons will be a deterrent on Russia. I think the opposite is true. The fear could lead to an extremely dangerous situation which would qualify, I would say, as the opposite of deterrence.

Senator BIDEN. I thank you very much.

Let me move on. And I am sorry to keep you so long, but you are both so well informed and there is so much I think the public has a right to know about what is at stake here. I will ask you only a few more questions.

Mr. Ambassador, I feel compelled to ask you, as a follow-on to what you just said, about another issue, one which might constitute an emerging crisis in our relations with Russia. And I refer to the dispute surrounding the planned Russian transfer to India of advanced missile engines and missile technology. You may be aware that there is a provision in the Freedom Support Act, one that caused some consternation when I authored it and when it passed, setting as one condition of aid to any newly independent state, including Russia, that it be in compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime, regardless of whether or not it has formally committed itself to it.

Although the planned Russian-Indian transfer is not scheduled to occur, as I understand it, until next year, the Bush administration, upon learning of the planned transfer, initiated sanctions against the relevant Russian companies. And if the sale goes through, it is clear to me that it will trigger the condition in the law that I authored. And there is a provision, a get-out-of-jail-free card so to speak, if the President concludes that it should be overridden, he can do so under certain circumstances.

That would, in turn, require either a cutoff of bilateral aid, something I strongly support, or a Presidential waiver on the grounds of prevailing national interests, which would raise other questions, I suspect.

And I am deeply concerned that this matter may now be festering into a major issue and, indeed, there may be confrontation between Moscow and Washington. As I understand it, the Russian Prime Minister has today postponed his planned trip to Washington, seemingly as a result of this dispute. What comment do you have on this issue?

Ambassador TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman, I hope you will permit me in open session to confine my comments to some fairly general observations for reasons that you clearly know and reflected in the way you posed the questions. This is an exceedingly important and delicate matter, and it is at an important and delicate stage. I would not describe that condition as festering. I would describe it

as being a point of intense consultation, discussion and, indeed, negotiation between the United States and Russia.

I have sat in on quite a bit of those proceedings this week. I have been very impressed by the determination, the goodwill, and the professionalism on both sides of the table, and the determination on both sides of the table to reach a satisfactory outcome.

As regards the Russian Prime Minister, Mr. Chernomyrdin's prospective visit to Washington, he will be coming here as the cochairman, along with Vice President Gore, of a U.S.-Russian commission on technological cooperation, which was established by Presidents Yeltsin and Clinton in Vancouver. There are issues on the agenda of that commission which we feel and the Russians feel would better be addressed once we have a couple of other things cleared out of the way.

But it is our hope that that meeting will go ahead soon and will be productive. It is, after all, not to be a negotiating session, but it is to be the first meeting of the commission that is going to give meaning to the word that I used earlier, "partnership," between these two countries.

Last, Mr. Chairman, let me just put before you this proposition. The essence of both policymaking and, indeed, diplomacy is often to try to reconcile various objectives and obligations. We in the administration are well aware of what U.S. law is on this subject. The Vice President of the United States has particular reason to be aware of that, since he was the cosponsor of the relevant piece of legislation.

The Clinton administration also takes extremely seriously the nonproliferation goals of this country. President Clinton, when he was running for the presidency, made much of that as an objective of his administration. We also take very seriously our determination to do everything we can to support the continuation of reform in Russia, a process that we believe is going forward in an extremely admirable and promising way under the leadership of President Yeltsin.

And one of the difficulties that President Yeltsin has and, indeed, has inherited from the old Soviet Union, is the problem of a grotesquely overmilitarized state and economy. And an important part of Russia being able to make the transition to a modern, democratic, prosperous state is being able to cope with the problem of defense conversion, and getting away from the reliance on the militarized segments of the Russian economy.

And we are going to do the best we can in our partnership with Russia to help them make that transition. But I am afraid that is all I have to say on the subject.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I will not ask you to say more, because I know you are available to us in closed session. Neither you, nor your counterpart, have ever failed to inform us in the appropriate forum of information we have sought or thought was important.

But I raise this to make a larger point, that while you are negotiating in Kiev, trying to get them to move forward on an issue that is of vital importance, to them, as well as to the United States; and while we are, at the same time, debating and not resolving, whether we are going to continue nuclear testing; and while the Chinese continue a policy as the rogue nation, along with Korea, in the

international community; and while the Russians are contemplating making it easier for India to become a more potent force militarily, it seems to me, at a minimum, that it complicates your job when you sit down in Kiev to make the case that they should be responsible in fulfilling their international obligations.

I think, and I know of no one who knows more about nuclear proliferation and the consequences of it than you from your former incarnation, your writings, and in your capacity in your former life as a journalist. And it seems to me that the administration has got a pretty sticky wicket here to negotiate. I do not get a sense that there is a clear path as to how it should be negotiated.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think it is a very complicated business, but, in one sense, the problem that you have highlighted here, and that I am not shedding a great deal of light on in the specific, simplifies the argument that we are making to Ukraine in the following sense.

Senator BIDEN. No, I am not asking you to shed light on it.

Ambassador TALBOTT. I hope it is apparent to our Ukrainian interlocutors that we take nonproliferation very seriously as a goal that we pursue in our relationship with all states in the region, including Russia. So, it underscores, as it were, the global and even-handed nature of our policy.

Senator BIDEN. What I am suggesting is that you may have a global problem of immense proportions and one that is very difficult to resolve. And when I drafted the legislation, I had no illusions about what it might force me as an individual Senator to confront. I see nothing that is more important on our agenda internationally and, in turn, at some point domestically, than to see Russia succeed. Russia's, failure, however we choose to define failure, is of enormous consequence to us and to the world at large.

I am fully aware that Russia with an overabundance of military hardware and little capacity to generate hard currency has enormous temptation. We may be placed between a rock and a hard place sooner than later on this, and I suggest that our policy toward China may impact this as well.

I know you are not unaware of my overwhelming dissatisfaction with the last administration's policy toward China and my unease about this administration's policy toward China. But I only speak for myself, and no one else here.

Let me ask a couple of questions, and then let you go. I will submit the rest in writing, because I have trespassed on your time maybe beyond what you anticipated already.

Secretary Slocombe, last week, the Defense Ministers of the Commonwealth of Independent States abruptly dissolved the CIS Joint Military Command, in effect, abandoning efforts to maintain a unified defense structure in the CIS. What is your understanding of the effect, if any, this has had on the command and control of nuclear weapons in Ukraine and other republics?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. As of right now, it is not clear what effect, if any, it will have. I think those issues have not been resolved there, and therefore, we do not know.

Senator BIDEN. Do you have any notion what may be behind the breakup of the joint command? Was it not workable? Or was it

something more complicated than that, to the best of your knowledge?

Mr. SLOCOMBE. I think—I am trying to figure out what we can say in open session on this.

Senator BIDEN. Well, if you have any doubt, you can withhold it. And I will ask, at your convenience, to set up a closed session, if you prefer that.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. But I would like to get something on the record. I think it is the case that the CIS, to put it mildly, did not fulfill the hopes which were originally placed in it; and in some sense, this step is a natural progression from that, the decay of that concept.

In terms of what its practical effects will be, I think they do not know, and therefore, we do not know.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, it is hard for us to know. Ambassador Talbott, President Yeltsin, and President Kravchuk met last week to discuss the future of the Black Sea Fleet, as one or both of you mentioned, and other security interests between Russia and Ukraine. As I understand it, the two leaders reached a vague agreement on the Black Sea Fleet, and Yeltsin was reported to have offered Ukraine security guarantees.

I would like to know a couple of things: First of all, what is your assessment of that meeting? Second, were there security guarantees offered? Do we know the nature of those guarantees? Is Yeltsin in any position, politically, to offer such guarantees?

Ambassador TALBOTT. Mr. Chairman, let me respond partially, and ask my colleague, Dr. Edelman, to fill it out.

As he and I both indicated earlier, we found the Yeltsin-Kravchuk meeting to be positive, both in tone and insofar as we can discern the substance, in that respect, too. We have seen, however, in the past, where what seemed to be quite favorable developments at the highest levels in the interaction between these two countries, has tended to evaporate or even been reversed as it got down, as it were, to the working level. So it will be very important to see what happens by way of followup.

On the question of the Black Sea Fleet, this was a major issue of the talks; in fact, it was really kind of the centerpiece. And the two Presidents agreed to divide the fleet and shore facilities 50-50, beginning this September. And there is a bilateral commission which will work out the details, and obviously that is what I was referring to; we will have to watch that very closely. Joint command of the fleet will continue until the year 1995, when the division of the fleet is supposed to be complete.

As for the issue of the Crimea, that per se did not come up; and perhaps Dr. Edelman will speak to the question of security guarantees.

Senator BIDEN. Doctor?

Dr. EDELMAN. Mr. Chairman, on the question of security guarantees, we do not know what precisely was offered. We are operating on the basis of the public statements, and on the basis of the press conferences held by the leaders. It appears that what President Yeltsin offered to provide the security guarantees now, operative upon the ratification of START and accession to the NPT.

From the point of view of what we have been discussing today, what may be of greater interest is that there was, as a part of this general discussion both of the security assurances or guarantees and the reiteration by President Kravchuk of Ukraine's determination to fulfill these commitments, that agreement was apparently reached on the question of the servicing of the weapons themselves. And that has been cited by President Kravchuk and Prime Minister Kuchma as a very positive achievement of this summit.

Ambassador TALBOTT. But, of course, the real security guarantee for Ukraine, that Ukraine wants from Russia, is a democratic Russia that pursues a live-and-let-live foreign policy with its neighbors.

Senator BIDEN. It seems to me it was clear, as Walt stated, that the ultimate security of Ukraine lies in a stable, democratic, free market, Western-looking, Russian democracy. But from what I read, from Ukrainian Nationals here in the United States, as well as from what I am able to understand from those Ukrainian voices in Ukraine who express a concern and unrelenting fear of Russia, is that the threat from Russia is not a consequence of the form of government they have. That it does not matter what form of government they have. That it relates mainly to animosity centuries-old, between the Russian people and Ukraine. And I wonder, when you are in Ukraine, do you get from those who suggest there is a need to have nuclear weaponry for purposes of security a sense of fear for Russia, the argument that, if Russia were more stable, then we would not have to worry? Or do they view this as a generic problem that will not be cured by whatever form of government Russia has? I am not sure I am articulating the question very well. But do you understand what I am driving at? I am just curious what they are thinking.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. No, I think you are articulating the question clearly enough, and I certainly do not hold myself out as an opinion on, as an expert on extreme nationalist Ukrainian opinion.

Senator BIDEN. But is it just extreme nationalist Ukrainian opinion? Or is it more broad-based? I get the impression it is more broad-based.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. They clearly are two peoples who have profound suspicions of each other. There is no question about that. On the other hand, both Kravchuk and Yeltsin, and they are not the only people in those two countries who have approached this problem and have seen that the answer is to try to build a relationship, try to build their two countries on a democratic, prosperous, independent, et cetera basis, but also to try to build their relationships on some basis that can go somewhere besides unrelenting hatred.

I mean, the description that you attribute could perfectly well be applied to France and Germany in 1946, and with good reason; and it is still true that there are a lot of Frenchmen who are not crazy about Germans. And there are a lot of Germans who think that the French have various failings. But as nations, they have been able to build a basis of a new kind of relation that has clearly been the best possible outcome from the point of view of their security.

And I think there are a lot of people in Ukraine, and there are certainly a lot of people in Russia, who believe that is the best course for Ukraine. As to the specifics of what people think, I just do not know.

Ambassador TALBOTT. If I could add just a couple of words, Mr. Chairman. I think that, while you obviously know this is not the case, one listening to our conversation who did not know geography and history very well might think that there were two countries here, one called Russia and one called Ukraine, and the country called Russia has got nothing but Russians living in it, and the country called Ukraine has got nothing but Ukrainians living in it. That, as we both know, is emphatically not the case.

I have been going to that part of the world for all of my adult life, and I have many colleagues and indeed friends in Russia, whose last names end with a "ko" or a "uk," that is, who are ethnic Ukrainians; in many cases, 100 percent. And, of course, there are a great many ethnic Russians living in Ukraine.

Senator BIDEN. Roughly, how many? Do you have any sense of that? Is it about 3 million? Or 11 million?

VOICES FROM THE FLOOR. 11 million.

Ambassador TALBOTT. A lot of people in the room seem to know. Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Ambassador TALBOTT. The point here is, this is an issue which, we hope, transcends in a positive sense, ethnicity. It is a question of statehood. It is a question of defining nationhood for multiethnic states, as both Russia and Ukraine are.

The other thing is, I am a little bit resistant of the notion of this kind of animosity being part of the genetic code of these people. I mean, we have seen other examples in the region of nations which have historically had very rocky relations, but are on a very good footing today.

And I would cite as, I think, a particularly relevant example of that the relationship between Ukraine and Poland, which have historically had a great, a lot of difficulties. And of course, Poland is an example of a state which has emerged from the cold war with a very bright future; lives right next to Russia; and under the leadership of President Walesa is marching into the future without, as far as we can tell, even considering the nuclear option.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I thank you. I have so much more to pursue, but I will leave it. Again, I may be playing devil's advocate, I am relating to you what I think may become potential obstacles in your attempt to negotiate a reasonable outcome for Ukraine and for the United States and all parties.

Let me ask you one more question: A very prolific writer and a Russian scholar in the United States, who has been a font of ideas for well over a decade, is Prof. Jerry Hough of Duke University. He wrote in the New York Times last week that Russia will soon begin to charge Ukraine market prices for its economic trade, particularly for the sale of oil, unless Kiev agrees to closer economic and military cooperation.

Playing this so-called oil card, according to this scenario, would put enormous pressure on Ukraine, whose economy is already crippled by high inflation and recent strikes in the coal industry. Has Professor Hough accurately predicted Russian intentions, in your view?

Ambassador TALBOTT. Part of the problem here is Russia's attempt to make a transition from a Communist economy to a free-market economy. And one of the, one of the imperatives or factors

there is the pressure on Russia to charge world prices for its natural resources; and particularly, energy resources, and oil. And that, obviously, has had a very troublesome effect on its economic relations with the other former republics of the Soviet Union, notably Ukraine.

Our sense is that there is, on the part of the Ukrainian and Russian leaderships, a desire to work this out in a way that will be as equitable as possible, and minimize the disruptions. But I would like to combine that observation with a point that we certainly make in our ongoing dialog with the Russians, and that is, it is extremely important for Russia to avoid any policies or actions that have the overtone of political pressure or blackmail. But maybe Dr. Edelman has something to add on this.

Dr. EDELMAN. I would just say that, again, this is an issue that was addressed in the Yeltsin-Kravchuk summit, and it does appear that an agreement has been reached to phase in movement to world prices for energy from Russia going to Ukraine by the end of this year, and there will be an offset of some kind, whereby the Ukrainians will charge world prices for carrying Russian energy to port and onward to market.

I am glad though, that you have raised Professor Hough's article, because as I recall another one of his suggestions was that the United States not insist on the complete and total independence of Ukraine, perhaps suggesting that we would be in favor of its reintegration with Russia. And I think you have heard from both Secretary Slocombe and Ambassador Talbott, that is emphatically not the policy of this administration.

Senator BIDEN. I am glad you pointed that out. I have, as I said, several additional questions; but I have taken too much of your time already. I wish you great luck on your efforts, Mr. Ambassador. There is nothing more critical that we have undertaken than what you are doing. And I sincerely hope that the administration takes another shot—I do not mean a gratuitous shot, but I mean makes an additional effort with our European friends—to move on their original policy in Bosnia. I think the consequences of the failure of our policy, and the European hopelessness with regard to Bosnia, are going to cause a lot of problems for you in your efforts to bring about a rational foreign policy that can be implemented for Ukraine, the United States, Russia, and the whole world.

But at any rate, I thank you very much. You have been kind and generous with your time, as usual. I may, Secretary Slocombe, depending on your availability, wish to pursue questions we were not able to discuss here.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Surely.

Senator BIDEN. Again, thank you gentlemen. We appreciate your being here today.

Mr. SLOCOMBE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Ambassador TALBOTT. Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. The hearing will come back to order, please.

Our second and very distinguished panel includes Dr. Bruce Blair, senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Blair has served as project director of the Office of Technology and Assessment. He previously testified before the subcommittee on Soviet command and control in 1991.

And Dr. Bilinsky, a professor of political science and international relations from my alma mater, the University of Delaware. He recently served as acting president of the Ukraine Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, and has written extensively on the former Soviet Union—Ukraine, in particular.

And I. Lewis Libby, a partner in the Washington law firm of Dickstein Shapiro & Morin. He was a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense and Policy in the Bush administration. He has also served in the Office of Policy Planning at the Department of State.

Senator BIDEN. Gentlemen, I welcome you. And Dr. Bilinsky, it is good to see you again. It has been a long time. And poor Dr. Bilinsky, probably in his worst nightmare, never thought he would have to be testifying before me in this committee. But it is amazing how things go, is it not, doctor?

Dr. BILINSKY. It is an honor, sir, and a pleasure.

Senator BIDEN. Let us get on to the important business of the committee, and Dr. Blair, how about if we start with you? And then Dr. Bilinsky and then Mr. Libby and we will move down. If you have an opening statement? Thank you and welcome back.

STATEMENT OF DR. BRUCE BLAIR, SENIOR FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. BLAIR. It is good to be here. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this opportunity to address the Ukrainian nuclear question.

I will assess the current operational status of nuclear forces in Ukraine, Ukraine's nuclear options in the future, and U.S. policy for dealing with the issue—a somewhat more technical survey of these issues—

Senator BIDEN. It is useful to have that, and I would appreciate it.

Dr. BLAIR. It will probably drive most people from the room, but we will give it a crack, anyway.

As we heard earlier, there are strategic missiles and bomber payloads in Ukraine, all of which appear to be under Russia's operational control. Although, as you alluded, until recently Russia pretended that the commander of the CIS Armed Forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, exercised nuclear authority over weapons in Ukraine, I believe he was cut out of the loop last September; and that, since that time, it has been effectively, from the standpoint of nuclear command and control, an all-Russian affair.

That is not altogether reassuring to some of us, given the constant danger of a lapse of competent civilian leadership in Russia, and given the failure of Russia to thoroughly subordinate the military to civilian authority.

The significance of the lack of institutional subordination of the military within the nuclear chain of command is underscored, in my view, by the fact that although only the President and the Defense Minister have the right to order nuclear launches, top Russian military leaders have the technical ability to carry them out. The civilian leaders have the right to decide, but the military holds the unblock codes and the launch codes. It is the same as in our system. Our President does not carry any codes that are included in orders that go down the chain of command either.

The technical wherewithal lies with, essentially, the general staff, who not only form the unblocking codes and launch orders, but also manage the transfer of authority among Presidential successors, in the Russian system. So they decide when and where and how a nuclear suitcase, the famous nuclear suitcases, are activated for successors.

There is a problem also, I think, in Russia still—and this was driven home during the coup; I will belabor the point one more time—of irrational leadership during periods of political crisis. It is something that we cannot ever take for granted; and we need to remember it, constantly. During the coup, the political leaders who staged it clearly had goals that diverged from the goals of the state. And on top of that, these people were desperate, exhausted, and often intoxicated leaders.

The fact of the matter is, such breakdowns could too easily happen again, as long as the political crisis impedes the creation of institutional safeguards, and as long as there is a possibility of a coup-like event.

A Russian officer recently told me about a proposal, an internal proposal, that indicated to me just how far they still have to go to create such institutional mechanisms in the nuclear chain of command. And the idea put forward was to put members of the Russian Parliament in the general staff war room, to ensure that the nuclear launch codes were not mishandled. This was a serious proposal.

Now, I belabor this Russian story, in part, because these are also the same reasons why I think we should be distressed if Ukraine gained operational control. If they go nuclear—these are not the only reasons, there are a lot of other repercussions, but this is one of the important ones—they lack the institutional mechanism, the mature mechanisms for a command system. And clearly, it is a politically unstable environment, that could produce bad judgment on the part of leaders.

Fortunately, Ukraine shows no signs of wanting this operational control. There is clearly an emerging political consensus to keep the nuclear arsenal until their security and their economic issues are resolved; but there is absolutely, as far as I can detect, no consensus building to retain or seize operational nuclear control.

As you know, the Government does seek administrative control, which essentially covers pay and promotion, as you heard earlier, and maintenance. Basically, all noncombat functions. And also entails administering oaths of allegiance to units in Ukraine. The missile crews, evidently, have not taken such oaths; whereas, the custodians of the bomber warheads located at two airstrips in Ukraine, evidently have. These are technical units, they are the local custodians for the bomber payloads.

Senator BIDEN. Now, would you say that again? I am sorry. Those units in control of the SS-19's and the SS-24's have not taken the oath?

Dr. BLAIR. That is right. There is no indication that they have, so far. And the Ukrainian position on this was only pushed forward, I guess, a month ago, or a little longer, when Ukraine asked that all of these troops take oaths of allegiance.

Senator BIDEN. I have got you, thank you.

Dr. BLAIR. These are members of the 43d Strategic Rocket Army. But some custodians of the bomber warheads evidently have. But they are, like almost all troops everywhere in the world, dually subordinate; which means that they have taken an oath of allegiance to Ukraine, but they still remain under the operational control of senior Russian commanders. Just like when I served on a Minuteman base, I had an administrative chain of command to the base commander; but he could not tell me to launch missiles. My operational chain of command ran through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It is the same arrangement there. The only difference today from prior to the breakup is that now they have got an administrative chain to the Ukrainian Air Force, instead of to the Russian Air Force.

I would like to point out here, though, that there is some evidence—and this is contrary to widespread belief—that not all the tactical warheads have been relocated to Russia. Because there are some fairly reliable indications, I think, that there are some tactical warheads in these bomber storage locations, that have been left over; and that they are for strike aircraft, perhaps the Backfires or the Fencers, which Ukraine inherited.

Senator BIDEN. How much of each of those forces did they inherit? All of them? The Backfires and the Fencers and——

Dr. BLAIR. I am not really sure, but I think, for example, there are something like 140 Fencers. I do not know what percentage that represents of the total number that were there before the breakup. I really do not know.

Senator BIDEN. Well, that gives me a sense of it. OK, thank you.

Dr. BLAIR. So this arrangement is not that surprising. And in fact, if you look closely you will find that Ukraine and Russia have worked out a modus vivendi on a lot of things. And they have not really splintered the operational chain of command at all. I will cite one, and that is an agreement reached a few weeks ago between Ukraine and Russia, to cooperate on the production of spare parts for the missiles; missiles, not only in Ukraine, but in the rest of the Soviet Union.

And by most reliable accounts, Ukraine has not done anything to impede the servicing of missile systems on their territory. There were stories concocted in Moscow back in, I think, April or so, to the contrary; but those, clearly, were politically motivated stories at the time, according to Russians who were close to the story.

This cooperation, on the servicing and the production of spare parts, and so forth, is really indispensable because the two countries are simply intertwined in the missile business. As you probably know, Ukraine builds the guidance systems for the SS-18's and SS-19's. Ukraine built the SS-18 missile itself, at a plant that has since been disassembled; and it built the SS-24 missile at a still intact plant.

Russia supplies the guidance for the SS-24, but Ukraine builds the blocking devices for it and every other Russian missile in the arsenal; although it is like building a computer, a blocking device that is attached to the missiles and command posts, that needs to be booted up with data, and that is done by officials from a design bureau in St. Petersburg. So it is a very integrated arrangement. It seems to be, for the most part, functioning fairly smoothly.

The one area where there has been a deliberate effort to dissociate the two countries in the missile business is on the one land-based missile that is under development; that is the modified SS-25. Not too long ago, there had been an arrangement that involved Ukraine in its development and production; and recently Russia managed to disconnect Ukraine from this program, and will have exclusive responsibility for it in the future.

Ukraine's interest in operational control, to come back to this, appears to be confined to a desire for a technical veto that would physically prevent Russia from launching missiles on its territory. It is a sovereignty issue. In private talks with Ukrainian officials——

Senator BIDEN. Why do you say that? I find that reassuring. But what is the evidence you have to sustain that conclusion, that it appears to be their intention, to essentially have a veto power?

Dr. BLAIR. Well, that is all they really talk about. Ukraine has not taken a position that they want operational control. Although there is a school of thought, as you heard earlier, along these lines in the debate in Parliament, that Ukraine should acquire operational control. But I am talking about the position of the Government, not about various political arguments that you hear in Kiev. The position of the government has been, in the operational realm, that they want a physical veto over the launch of weapons on their territory; and they were promised this, I am convinced, during private conversations between Shaposhnikov and senior Ukrainian officials, back in late 1991. They were promised that they would get this device; and that it would be installed sometime in 1993.

Well, we know that it never materialized. Although I would point out that President Kravchuk, in a sense, is no worse off than President Yeltsin is, because neither one of them have a physical veto.

Senator BIDEN. Why would it not be in the Russian interest to accommodate that?

Dr. BLAIR. Well, for one reason these blocking devices, at least as they are currently configured, not only block unauthorized launches, they are integral to the launch process. They are blocking devices that, when the codes are inserted into them, activate the flight plans of the missiles. So it is part of the launch sequence, as well as part of the regime of safeguards. It is a very complex piece of equipment. It is much more sophisticated than the U.S. arrangement for use of coded switch devices.

And by the way, all this can happen without any involvement of the crews at the bottom. Because it is all automated, the general staff can control it by remote control, bypassing all humans down the chain of command.

At the present time, the local missile crews, who might switch their allegiance to Ukraine, I believe could not feasibly defeat the current safeguards, at least not quickly. Were they to attempt an actual launch, they would need these unblocking codes that are held by the general staff in Moscow. Without those codes, they are physically unable to launch.

If they tried to pick the lock, they would have three chances, and they are out of business. But also, this effort, this illicit attempt, would be reported to the general staff headquarters in Moscow and to the SRF headquarters automatically by radio links, where gen-

eral staff officers then could respond by sending a command down the communications network that would actually isolate these deviant local command posts, and switch effective electronic control to loyal command posts.

In fact, the general staff appears to have the technical ability to instruct all the missiles in Ukraine to disregard any launch or unblocking orders, sent by any command post in Ukraine; in effect, isolating the missiles from human control in Ukraine, which would pose a bit of a difficult problem for Ukraine if they wished to fire them then. They would have to pry open the silos and go from there.

Of course, as everyone knows, none of this is foolproof. All these safeguards are really, more or less, technical gimmicks designed to buy time; and if there were a massive, concerted effort on the part of the Ukrainian Government to seize control, the only foolproof response from Russia's standpoint to restore control, would be almost certainly to intervene militarily, and regain physical custody.

Senator BIDEN. There is no ability from afar to destroy the launcher without detonating the missile, is there?

Dr. BLAIR. By remote control? I do not believe so. But I believe there are devices on each silo that would disable the missile launcher in the event of an illicit penetration. There are sensors surrounding the silos that would detect it, and then act to disable the system. But to my knowledge, that cannot be done by remote control.

If Ukraine as a Government were to seize control of these missile forces, and then replace these blocking devices with their own, which they build, and activate them in the manner that is normally done by the design bureau in St. Petersburg, then the only real major hurdle remaining for them to project a deterrent at Moscow would be to reprogram flight plans, or targets, for the missile computers; which would be extraordinarily difficult to do in some cases like the SS-24 missiles, because the guidance is built in Russia, not in Ukraine, and it would be difficult for Ukraine to both build the guidance and tie it into the blocking devices which activate the flight plans.

Also, for them to have any confidence in the SS-24's, they would absolutely have to flight-test them. And they do not have test launch facilities, and I doubt whether anyone would offer overflight permission to conduct any testing.

Also, as you pointed out, Senator Biden, the SS-24 evidently cannot be fired at very short range. Its shortest range in its testing history is about 1,700 miles, which would put it, from the fields in Ukraine, would put it within a minimum range of, roughly, Novosibirsk. Anything closer in would be too close. So it would certainly overshoot Moscow, which is 600 miles away from the fields.

Senator BIDEN. How about the SS-19?

Dr. BLAIR. I am turning to that. Ukraine does build the guidance for the SS-19 and, I think, could aim them at Moscow. It was a missile designed for variable range, as Walt Slocombe indicated. It was designed to be used on a contingent basis, against Western Europe. And this variable range missile has been routinely tested at ranges just over 600 miles; and in one case, in 1974, it was tested

below 600 miles. So it clearly has the configuration to be used at short range, and to be aimed at Moscow.

But Ukraine does not build this missile, unlike the SS-24. And its service life ends in 1998. So it has got a difficult long-term option here, to try to maintain the SS-19's in a combat-ready status. They would basically have to take the current arsenal of 130 SS-19's and, like we do in the U.S. Air Force all the time, start cannibalizing the assets, to try to maintain a small number in operational condition. That is a losing proposition over the long term.

I might also add that Russia has not been replenishing tritium, I believe, in any of the missiles, for at least a year, and possibly a year and a half. The Russians, I am told, normally replace tritium, which is the material that boosts the yield of weapons, every 18 months or so; which means that that boosting factor is degrading. It is a wasting asset. And in a few years, say 3 or 4 or 5, I suppose that those weapons would be assessed as having yields in the range of a kiloton, instead of hundreds of kilotons.

The better option for Ukraine, for a nuclear threat, probably would be based on air-delivered weapons, which I will not go into here. I am running out of time. And I would only add that their safeguards are more primitive; they require less maintenance; they can be employed more flexibly; and again, their custodians have sworn allegiance to Ukraine. However, it is believed that the guidance for the air-launched cruise missiles have been disabled by Russia, and that the blocking devices on the weapons remain intact and use codes provided only by Moscow.

Well, I have a proposal that I am not going to read to you, but I will just enter it into the record, which is something that I wrote. It appeared in the New York Times a few weeks ago, a proposal to try to defuse this possible crisis, nuclear crisis, between Ukraine and Russia, by inviting Ukraine and Russia to join the United States in dismantling all warheads covered by START I and II; and along with the bomber warheads, which have been taken off alert by both sides under the Bush-Gorbachev agreement, consolidating all these weapons, the warheads, in the territory of the countries from which they came.

So all Ukrainian weapons, some 2,000 of them, would be put in a storage depot on Ukrainian territory, and would be under multi-lateral inspection and control by, at least, Ukrainians, Russians, and Americans.

This is not a particularly original idea, and I know that you, Senator Biden, had a similar idea over a year ago.

Senator BIDEN. Well, I like it very much. Your idea is much more fleshed out than mine; but it is totally consistent.

Dr. BLAIR. Completely.

Senator BIDEN. It seems to me it would be in the interest of all three countries for us to do that.

Dr. BLAIR. Absolutely. I think so. I think it would allay most of the concerns that they all have. It would certainly remove these forces from operational control. Nobody would have operational abilities to fire them, which I think would respect everyone's sovereignty, and give confidence to Ukraine, and so on and so forth.

I think, just to add though, that toward Ukraine we should draw the line in a stern way on the issue of operational control. I think we should stress to them that we would not accept any attempt by them to develop either the capability to exercise operational control, or obviously to actually seize operational control. I might add that it is quite possible that many of these missiles have been deactivated, and I think we should press Ukraine to allow Russia to continue this process.

The official estimates, I believe, say that there is no evidence that any of the SS-19's or SS-24's have been taken off line. But I believe that there is some credible information that was received privately, through Russians, that they have taken a large fraction of their missile forces off alert. It is hard to tell this. There are still crews in the field; they are still doing drills. The activity could be explained as an effort just to ensure that there is a controlled and phased and safe deactivation of missile forces, just like we kept crews on our Minuteman forces after we turned off the guidance and took them off alert, because we want to monitor their safety and security.

Finally, our policy toward Ukraine obviously involves some advice to Russia. I think we should try to get them to back off from insisting that Ukraine turn over its weapons in 2 years, which I believe was its last official proposal to Ukraine, which Ukraine has not responded to, and then sell them—that is, the Russians—on the idea of this multilateral storage that I just mentioned.

We should ask Russia to recognize the existing borders of Ukraine. We should tell them that we approve of their steps to deactivate missiles and to let the tritium in the warheads decay without replenishment, and that we are happy that they continue to take responsibility for safety and security of the systems.

On the sort of stern end of the spectrum, I think we should be quite clear that we believe it would not be prudent but in fact quite dangerous to everyone if they were to act precipitously to try to move the weapons out of Ukraine back to Russia or to in any way intervene militarily on a unilateral basis.

Last, I just want to make a quick comment about U.S. policy, current policy, which I believe basically conforms to the overall direction that I just outlined. This idea of multilateral storage was taken by Secretary Aspin to Kiev. I understand that it was reasonably well-received by Ukrainians, but not so much by Russians.

I believe that U.S. policy is really quite commendable as far as it goes, and I would mention only a few small quarrels, beginning with the fact that I do think it overemphasizes the importance of rapid dismantling of weapons in the former Soviet Union.

A strong case could be made that the fissile material is best protected against theft if it is kept in the warheads and guarded by military custodians in secure storage sites. To move unprecedented quantities of raw fissile material, and we really are talking about a huge amount, through the dismantling pipeline at an unprecedented speed poses arguably a larger risk than keeping them in their shells and gradually dismantling the system according to normal schedules and normal work paces.

In other words, I think fissile material is more susceptible to theft in the civilian cycle of the nuclear weapons business than it is if it is in bombs under military custody.

Second, our current policy tends often to overstate the risk that all of our START agreements and NPT agreement will unravel if Ukraine balks at ratification. I think we need, from what I have heard today, to give the Parliament a little more patience to work through their debate on this issue.

We should press for Ukrainian accession to the NPT and START ratification, but I personally do not think that we should go any further in twisting arms in the Ukrainian Parliament than we would expect a foreign government to twist arms in the U.S. Senate on the question of treaty ratification.

As was pointed out earlier, we did not ratify START II. Furthermore, we scrapped START II.

Senator BIDEN. You mean SALT.

Dr. BLAIR. I am sorry, SALT.

I believe it was in the fall of 1986, when we hit the 130th ALCM bomber, when President Reagan decided that we were not going to be bound by this agreement any longer, so it was not even necessarily a binding obligation at the executive level.

I think we should acknowledge in the same vein that things are not going to fall apart, necessarily, if Ukraine delays ratification for a while. The truth is, Russian inventory will probably drop to START II levels whether there is a treaty or not, given their current modernization program and the mass obsolescence of their systems as they come about.

We would have to rethink a lot of things, especially verification, but we could work out—easily work out an accommodation that continues our large reductions in strategic forces, even if Ukraine does not come along in the way we would like.

Last, I wonder and doubt whether our Government has worked out any contingency plans to deal with the possibility of a Ukrainian-Russian confrontation over nuclear custody. It is remote, in my judgment, but a possible occurrence, and I think we should be prepared for it.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Blair follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. BLAIR

Chairman, thank you for this opportunity to address the Ukrainian nuclear question. I'll assess the current operational status of nuclear forces in Ukraine, Ukraine's nuclear options in the future, and U.S. policy for dealing with this issue.

The nuclear arsenal in Ukraine consists of strategic missiles and bomber payloads, all of which appear to be under Russia's operational control. Although until recently Russia pretended that the commander of the CIS armed forces, Marshal Shaposhnikov, exercised nuclear authority over Ukrainian forces, I believe he was cut out of the loop last September, at which time nuclear control became an all-Russian affair as a practical matter.

Of course to say that Russia alone exercises operational control is not completely reassuring given the constant danger of a lapse of competent civilian leadership, and given Russia's failure to thoroughly subordinate the military to civilian authority.

Regarding military subordination, there really is a lack of clear civilian authority. Yeltsin has not created new institutions for civilian control to replace the old communist party apparatus. His authority rests mainly on personal loyalties particularly with the defense minister, who is a close political ally. Incoherence at the center of the political system—power struggles between the executive and legislative

branches and deep divisions within each branch—have imperiled civilian control in an institutional sense, and invited the military to intervene in politics even though it shows no signs of wanting to seize power. Fortunately the armed forces still feel bound by a norm of professionalism that rejects intervention in politics. Still, this norm is not a sufficient basis for civil-military relations, and the norm is inevitably strained by political crises such as the 1991 coup attempt.

The significance of fragile allegiances within the nuclear chain of command is underscored by the fact that although only the president and the defense minister have the right to order nuclear launches, top Russian military leaders have the technical ability to carry them out. The civilian authorities have the right to decide, but the military holds the unblock and launch codes. The Russian general staff also decides whether and when to transfer nuclear authority to the president's successors, and to activate their famous nuclear suitcases.

The abortive coup also reminded us of the potential for irrational leadership. The plotter's political aims clearly diverged from the goals of the state and on top of that these people became desperate, exhausted, and often intoxicated. Leaders in this state become prone to bad judgment to put it mildly. The lack of coherence at the center of Russian politics during such periods of emergency also confuses the chain of command, and *de facto* nuclear authority simply devolves to military leaders.

Such break-downs could too easily happen again as long as the political crisis impedes the creation of institutional safeguards. A Russian officer told me about a recent internal proposal that indicates just how far they still have to go to create such mechanisms. The idea was to assign representatives of parliament to the war room of the general staff to guard against mishandling of the nuclear launch codes.

For similar reasons we would be distressed if Ukraine gained operational control over nuclear weapons. The contrary view—that a nuclear Ukraine and Russia would stabilize their relationship—is dangerously misguided in no small measure because it ignores the severe internal threats to reliably effective nuclear command and control in the former Soviet Union.

Ukraine fortunately shows no indications of wanting independent launch control. Although there is an emerging political consensus to keep the nuclear arsenal until outstanding security and economic matters are resolved, no political consensus exists to seize operational control. The government does seek administrative control over all non-combat activities which covers pay, promotion and maintenance and also entails having all combat units take oaths of allegiance to Ukraine. The missile crews evidently have not yet taken the oaths, in contrast to the bomber warhead custodians. The bomber warheads are held in storage at the two strategic airbases in Ukraine. Their custodians are technical support units administratively subordinate to the Ukrainian air force. They do not belong to the 12th custodial directorate of the general staff which previously maintained the now-closed central depots for nuclear warheads. However, they should still be operationally subordinate to high-level Russian commanders. Contrary to widespread belief, the payloads in their custody probably include a sizable quantity of tactical nuclear weapons for strike aircraft.

Ukraine and Russia seem to have found a *modus vivendi* that satisfies maintenance requirements. They reached an agreement a few weeks ago to cooperate on the production of spare parts for the missile systems in the FSU and by the most reliable accounts Ukraine has done nothing to impede the servicing of systems on their soil. This cooperation is really indispensable because Russia and Ukraine each produce vital parts of almost all missile systems. For instance, Ukraine builds the guidance systems for the SS-18 and SS-19 missiles. Ukraine built the SS-18 missile itself at a plant that has been disassembled, and built the SS-24 missile at a still intact plant. Russia supplies the guidance for the SS-24. Ukraine builds the blocking devices for all the strategic missiles in the FSU, devices which are booted up with data by a design bureau in St. Petersburg. Doubts about future cooperation with Ukraine, however, led Russia to take sole responsibility for the only strategic missile under development: a modernized mobile SS-25 which had previously been under joint development with Ukraine.

Ukraine's interest in operational control seems confined to a desire for a technical veto that would physically prevent Russia from launching missiles without Ukrainian permission. In private talks with Ukrainian officials in late 1991, Marshal Shaposhnikov pledged to devise such a veto and install it sometime in 1993. The device failed to materialize, however, although President Kravchuk was left no worse off than President Yeltsin, who also lacks a technical veto. Since Ukraine actually builds the blocking devices, it may well be investigating its options to proceed unilaterally. The devices unfortunately do more than just block unauthorized launches; they are also integral to the launch process. If Ukraine replaced the cur-

rent devices with their own, they would be able to activate the flight plans on the missiles and fire them.

At the present time, local missile crews who might switch their allegiance to Ukraine could not feasibly defeat the current safeguards quickly. Were they to attempt an actual launch, they would need the unblocking codes held in Moscow by the general staff. Any attempt to pick the lock would be automatically reported to Moscow (the general staff war room as well as the Strategic Rocket Force headquarters). The general staff can then send special commands that isolate the deviant launch centers and transfer launch control to other loyal command posts. If the lock is somehow picked, the general staff can transmit a command called a "zero flight command" that negates the local action and restores the blocking function. The general staff has the technical ability to instruct all the unmanned missiles to disregard any commands from any command post in Ukraine.

Of course this isn't foolproof. The various safeguards are really just gimmicks designed to buy time. In the event of a massive and concerted security violation undertaken by the government of Ukraine, Russia would have to send in troops to preserve its control.

The status of some 600 bomber warheads is less clear. Ukraine may have *de facto* custody of these weapons though it is believed that blocking devices remain intact and that guidance components have been removed from the cruise missiles.

If Ukraine were to seize intact missile forces, and replace and activate the blocking devices, the remaining major hurdle to establishing a credible missile deterrent aimed at Moscow would be to program new target sets for the missile computers. This would be very difficult to do for the SS-24 missiles because though the missiles themselves are manufactured in Ukraine the guidance for them is built in Russia. Ukraine could eventually build the guidance system, and match it with the blocking devices, but Ukrainian confidence in the product would absolutely require flight testing. It lacks test launch facilities for this and no one least of all Russia would grant permission for overflying their territory during flight tests. Furthermore, the SS-24 cannot be fired at short range. The shortest range in its testing history is approximately 1,700 miles; it would certainly overshoot Moscow which lies about 600 miles from the Ukrainian missile fields.

By contrast, Ukraine builds the guidance for SS-19s and could aim them at Moscow. This missile type was designed for short-range theater missions against Western Europe as well as intercontinental missions against North America. It has been routinely tested at ranges just over 600 miles and in one case below 600 miles. On the other hand, Ukraine does not build this missile, and its service life ends in 1998. It does not offer a long-term option. Ukraine would have to cannibalize the existing inventory of increasingly decrepit missiles in order to keep some small number combat ready.

A Ukrainian nuclear option may be more feasibly based on air-delivered weapons. Their safeguards are more primitive, they require less maintenance, they can be employed more flexibly, and their custodians have sworn allegiance to Ukraine. Nevertheless it is believed that blocking devices using Russian codes remain intact and that Russia disabled the guidance on the air-launched cruise missiles.

I think creative diplomacy is needed rather urgently to defuse the rising tension between Ukraine and Russia over the nuclear issue. Pressuring Ukraine to ratify agreements and then turning over its arsenal to Russia within a year or two is counterproductive. We should adopt an even-handed approach that rests on basic principles of international law, respecting Ukraine's sovereignty and its parliament's right to debate and decide on issues affecting their security. We should not focus exclusively on the nuclear agenda—Ukraine refuses to talk on these terms anyway. We should promote Ukrainian integration into international structures, instead of threatening to isolate it.

One promising avenue toward this integration is to invite Ukraine to join Russia and the United States in removing all warheads from missiles slated for elimination under the terms of START I and II and placing them in storage depots in our respective territories under joint monitoring. This agreement would also cover bomber weapons. Ukraine would accept that all 2,000 nuclear weapons would be expeditiously placed in central depots on Ukrainian territory. American, Russian, and Ukrainian inspectors would continuously monitor the site. Other teams of similar composition would monitor offloaded weapons in storage in Russia and the United States.

As part of the deal, Ukraine would remain obliged to honor its START I commitment to eliminate these stockpiles within 7 years. In the meantime all the parties would allay many of their current fears. Russia and the United States would be assured that Ukraine remains a non-nuclear state and could not easily reverse course. Ukraine would derive considerable security assurance from the presence of Amer-

ican personnel at a critical military facility on its territory. The offloading of weapons and American presence would also uphold Ukraine's right to prevent Russia from using nuclear weapons deployed on Ukrainian territory. And its participation in a multilateral nuclear agreement would enhance its regional and international prestige. Lastly, direct American monitoring of the disposition of the weapons would increase Ukrainian confidence that the weapons would not wind up in the Russian inventory. It would also be better assured that the value of the uranium recovered from the weapons would wind up in Ukraine's bank account. This solution respects Ukrainian sovereignty while defusing the issue of weapons ownership, the main stumbling block to Ukraine's joining the NPT.

Our sternness toward Ukraine should be reserved for the one area that poses a real immediate threat to the United States: operational launch control. We should stress that we draw the line at any Ukrainian attempt to develop a capability for independent launch control or to seize such control. In this vein we should press Ukraine to allow Russia to deactivate missiles and offload their warheads. This process is probably further along than currently believed. Although official U.S. estimates apparently find no evidence that the Ukrainian forces have been taken off-line, there is a body of contrary evidence indicating that a large fraction of the missile forces have already been deactivated. The missiles have been taken out of the Russian war plan. Any efforts at maintaining them are devoted largely to ensuring a controlled phased deactivation rather than to keep them combat ready.

Our policy toward Ukraine obviously involves advice to Russia. We should try to get them to back off from insisting that Ukraine turn over the weapons in 2 years, and sell them on the idea of multilateral storage of weapons on Ukrainian soil. Russia should understand that we expect them to recognize the existing borders of Ukraine. We strongly approve of their steps to deactivate missiles and to let the tritium in the warheads decay without replenishment. Our advice on the operational issue should be to discourage Russia from any special operations taken to remove weapons from Ukraine or to intervene unilaterally in anyway.

My impression of current U.S. policy toward Ukrainian security is that it conforms to the direction just outlined. It impresses me as highly commendable as far as it goes. I do have several small quarrels with it. First, it overemphasizes the importance of rapid dismantling of weapons in the FSU. A case can be made that the fissile material is best protected against theft if it is kept in the warheads and guarded by military custodians in secure storage depots. To move unprecedented quantities of raw fissile material through the dismantling pipeline poses arguably a larger risk. Second, current policy overstates the risk that START agreements will unravel if Ukraine balks at ratification. The truth is that Russian inventories will drop to START II levels with or without a treaty in force. Third, I doubt that the U.S. Government has worked as hard as it should to develop crisis contingency plans to deal with a nuclear confrontation between Ukraine and Russia.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you very much.

Dr. Bilinsky, why do you not begin your statement?

STATEMENT OF YAROSLAV BILINSKY, PROFESSOR, DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE, NEWARK, DE

Dr. BILINSKY. My name is Yaroslav Bilinsky. I am professor of political science and international relations at the University of Delaware. I speak as a political scientist and as an American citizen. I do not in any way represent the Government of Ukraine.

Senator Biden, sir, two nations have the greatest moral right to possess nuclear weapons—Israel and Ukraine.

The leaders of Israel have wisely decided that one Holocaust was enough. Ukraine is the victim of Stalin's genocide and of cultural genocide under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev. Over 5 million Ukrainian peasants, over one-quarter of Ukraine's rural population, were killed in the terror-famine of 1932–33. In addition, Stalin ordered over 2 million Ukrainian intellectuals, workers, and peasants killed in the "great terror" of the 1930's.

Under Khrushchev, Brezhnev, and Gorbachev, millions of Ukrainians were lost to Russification—the equivalent of cultural

genocide. But for the grace of God, the people of Ukraine, with their 1,000-year-old history, would have been wiped off the map.

No nation in the world can deny Ukraine's moral right to keep nuclear weapons, to prevent another genocide, least of all the Russians, who, albeit indirectly, have profited from the physical and cultural genocide of Ukrainians.

Second, as one of the successor states of the Soviet Union, recognized as such in the Lisbon protocol of May 23, 1992, Ukraine has the legal right either to keep or to give up all or a part of its nuclear arsenal.

The nuclear weapons deployed in Ukraine have been inherited from the now-defunct U.S.S.R. They are the property of Ukraine, and it is up to the Parliament of Ukraine, nobody else, to dispose of those weapons in the best interest of the people of Ukraine.

At the same time, the Parliament and the Government of Ukraine know that they have certain responsibilities toward the United States, and I am sure that they will fulfill those responsibilities.

Sir, for a long time I have admired your stand on Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is a profile of courage, and it is farsighted. The long and short of my testimony here is that Ukraine does not want to become another Bosnia. Ukraine does not want tea and sympathy and a tombstone. From the United States and from the so-called world community, Ukraine expects fairness and a greater understanding of its legitimate security needs.

In return for this, Ukraine will do more than its share to maintain a balance of power in Europe and the world. Do not forget, please, that it was the independence referendum in Ukraine on December 1, 1991, that precipitated the downfall of the old Soviet Union on December 8, 1991. It was not on the December 25. I respectfully disagree with Ambassador Talbott. It was already on December 8 that the process started irrevocably.

Thank you very much for your kind attention. I will be honored and pleased to answer your questions.

[The preprinted articles "Evolutionary Problems in the Former Soviet Armed Forces" and "Ukraine and Russia in Their Historical Encounter" may be found in the committee files.]

Senator BIDEN. Thank you, professor. Mr. Libby.

STATEMENT OF I. LEWIS LIBBY, FORMER DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Mr. LIBBY. Thank you, Senator. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you. We have had long discussions, so let me just make a few points, and then maybe there will be some other issues in the questions.

This is a difficult issue, because it comes at the intersection of two areas of policy, one is the nonproliferation, nuclear area of policy, and the other is the question of what U.S. interests are in Europe.

Your committee, I feel, has to resolve these issues, which is a difficult task because there is not a consensus on what U.S. policy should be in Europe in the post-cold war era——

Senator BIDEN. That is right.

Mr. LIBBY [continuing]. Let alone what our strategy should be, and even what our interests should be. These things are not yet defined in the body politic.

We have only the haziest of outlines of how things could go wrong or how they could go right, and without that type of sense, there is not much of an indication that we can understand how best to use our policy toward Ukraine to further at the margin, which is what diplomacy does, what we need to have in our American interest.

Your questioning, I believe, on Yugoslavia highlights this problem. This is a crisis that came too soon, before anyone really had sensed what our interests would be. So, therefore, I feel that without a sense of where we want to go in Europe, it is very difficult for us to steer the second half of this policy problem, which is the European side of this problem.

It is further complicated because Ukraine's future course on nuclear weapons and on democracy is greatly affected by the credibility of our policy in Europe, and if we do not know what our policy in Europe is, certainly Ukrainians will not know what our policy in Europe is.

They face not an abstract decision on the moral rightness of nuclear weapons, or the sanctity of past declarations, but rather a very real decision in the context of today, which they see—they see—as affecting their future survival. Insecurity, I maintain, is a very poor frame of mind to be in when someone is asking you to give up nuclear weapons. Without greater clarity on the European security problem, it is very hard for them to get beyond the insecurity.

You have asked several times about people's discussions with Ukrainian officials. Let me share a few points from my discussions with them from 1990 until this winter of 1993. First, they would say, I think, that Russia has not shown that it is serious about Ukraine being nonnuclear; what it has shown is that it is serious about using the nuclear issue to bash the Ukraine Government over the head and try and isolate it internationally.

The HEU agreement, which I will not go into detail on, but which was the subject of questioning by Senator Lugar while, I think, you were out of the room, is evidence of this.

The second thing I think they would say is that the United States has not, at least until this spring, shown that it was serious about an independent Ukraine. You alluded to the "Chicken Kiev" speech, which was certainly one of the highlights of that school of thought. Again, I am quoting what they said, what was said to me.

The third area is, they say, "Look, we are giving up all of our nuclear weapons. We are not cutting by a third to where we still have thousands of nuclear weapons. We are giving them all up, and if we give them all up, that should be worth, in market terms, a premium. We should get better treatment than those who keep thousands of nuclear weapons, not worse treatment."

Instead, what they see as they look around is a weak Western policy toward Yugoslavia, a NATO which is inward-looking, or having an identity crisis, falling defense budgets, U.S. troops withdrawing from Europe, civic strife in the Russified portion of their country, and a Russia whose democratic course remains uncertain.

You asked a question earlier about whether Ukrainians express this view. What I have heard them say is that even the Democrats in Russia do not accept an independent Ukraine. There are, of course, exceptions, even among the leading Democrats.

I would submit that when your committee has gone through its study, it may find that Europe remains of critical importance to America even in the post-cold war world, that we have responsibilities there and interests to protect, that an independent, democratic Ukraine is of enormous importance to the future of Europe, and to our future. We can look to history for some guide on that. But there is a very important new fact in the history of Europe, and that is the independence of Ukraine. For more authority on that, ask the Poles, as Ambassador Talbott mentioned.

I say that a nonnuclear Ukraine is not a moral or strategic success if at the same time Ukraine fails as an independent democratic state, and its failure as a democratic state would imperil our position and the future of democracy in Russia.

For these reasons, I think the policy outlines mentioned earlier of a broadbased policy are sound ones. You can pick at the corners, but it is the right policy even if your sole focus is the nuclear issue.

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. That is what I call great timing. Thank you.

Let me begin with you, Mr. Libby, and then invite Dr. Bilinsky and Mr. Blair to respond.

Would you both speak to me for a moment about the present state of Ukrainian political affairs vis-a-vis Ukraine, not vis-a-vis Russia. How stable are the "democratic" instincts and institutions that are being put in place in Ukraine now?

Mr. LIBBY. I would start by saying Ukraine has an additional burden on its road to reform, which is defining itself and holding the country together.

There is an enormous concern in Ukraine about the Russified east and the nearly 11 million Russians living there. It is my personal belief that that has crippled their efforts at economic reform, because they have been so concerned about having the Russian, Russified people in the east of Ukraine having it worse than the Russians across the border that they have taken the very slowest of approaches on reform.

Senator BIDEN. Say that again. They have been concerned about the Russians in Ukraine, the Russian nationality—

Mr. LIBBY. Right, in the east of Ukraine.

Senator BIDEN [continuing]. Having been worse off economically than Russians in Russia.

Mr. LIBBY. They want those people—the Russians living in eastern Ukraine—to have a higher standard of living than the Russians across the border from them in Russia proper, and to do that, I believe it has slowed down its economic reform, not with long-term thinking in mind, but with the short-term. In effect they are saying, "Let us put more and more time between us and independence, while we are still an independent State."

The result of that is that they have not taken those steps which are very painful, but which you and I would say are necessary for them to have long-term stability and a viable economy.

Senator BIDEN. Dr. Bilinsky.

Dr. BILINSKY. I would partly agree with what Secretary Libby said. Ukraine is concerned about the fate of the Russian minority, and Ukraine has given major concessions to the Russian minority by practically putting the Ukrainization of the educational system on hold and generally they have tried to have the very best relations with that group.

This, in the long run, is not good, because one of the things that Ukrainians have been accused of, and I think rightly accused of, is that they are not always self-assertive when it is necessary to be self-assertive, so in the long run there are a number of issues on which the Russian minority simply will have to yield, such as Ukrainization of the press, Ukrainization of book publishing, which was very, very bad under Brezhnev and Gorbachev. To a certain degree, a number of universities that teach in Ukraine will have to teach in Ukrainian.

To put it bluntly, Kiev should become more of a Ukrainian city than it is now. At the same time, Ukraine is prepared to extend full civil rights, political and civil rights to the Russian minority, without, however, giving them a veto right over parts of the Ukrainian territory that is a secessionist right, and also without giving them a veto right over such existential questions as nuclear defense, armed conventional forces, and so on and so forth.

If I may add, Mr. Chairman, I have just published an article on Russian-Ukrainian relations, which was written some time ago, and it is dedicated to a Russian. It is dedicated to the late Anatoliy Beklemishev, who is a scion of a noble Russian family. There is a Beklemishev Tower in the Kremlin, I understand. Anatoliy Beklemishev spent his adult life in Kiev. He felt himself a citizen of Kiev and had been a patriot of Ukraine.

There are definitely Russians in Ukraine and outside of Ukraine, such as Yelena Bonner, for instance, who recognize the independence of Ukraine, and with those Russians the Ukrainian Government and the Ukrainian people are going to collaborate full hilt, but those who say that the referendum of 1991, in which 90 percent of the people voting endorsed independence was a misunderstanding, and that Ukraine should be "rolled up," well, you cannot really debate with those people—I am sorry.

Senator BIDEN. If I can pursue that another moment, as you alluded to, professor, I have been very concerned about the inability or unwillingness of the United States, and to a much greater extent in my view, Europe, to deal with the crisis in Bosnia Herzegovina.

This is what I believe to be a blatant act of Serbian aggression. It has become much more complicated for a lot of reasons, but I think the complications were predictable in light of where the process began.

One of the principles that I think is being sacrificed in Bosnia is that of nationhood. Nationhood is not and should not be determined based upon the ethnic origins of the peoples constituting an internationally recognized state. But the fact there are very few places in Central or Eastern Europe, or Europe as a whole, for that matter, where, should that be the measure of nationhood and sovereignty, we are not asking for serious trouble.

Now, one of the things I acknowledge I do not feel competent to comment on is the extent of the intensity of feelings on the part of Russians, ethnic Russians, living in Ukraine.

When I asked the question of Ambassador Talbott the answer was 11 million. Is that roughly correct, are there 11 million people living in Ukraine who refer to themselves and think of themselves as, quote, Russians?

Dr. BILINSKY. It is correct according to the 1989 census. But the 1989 census was taken before the independence movement of Ukraine gathered steam, and it gathered steam very fast. There is serious opinion in Ukraine that, under present conditions, possibly up to 5 million—5 million—of those so-called ethnic Russians in Ukraine could switch and declare themselves Ukrainians, assuming, of course, that Ukraine becomes more of a going economic concern and that the liberal ethnic policies will be maintained.

At one time, the Prime Minister of Ukraine was an ethnic Russian. The Defense Minister is a part—ethnic Russian. His father is Russian, his mother is Ukrainian. I understand the Attorney General of Ukraine is an ethnic Russian, a Ukrainian Jew is the Vice Prime Minister in charge of fuel concerns. So a determined effort and a partly successful effort has been made to make Ukraine into a multiethnic state.

Senator BIDEN. That was my question because, you see, one of the things I want to get on the record here is that it is very difficult for we Americans to understand. Americans, and even first-generation Americans, but second-, third-, fourth-, fifth-generation Americans, to understand that there is such a cleavage between one's ethnic background and one's nationality.

For example, there are tens of thousands of Americans who consider themselves Italian-Americans or Greek-Americans or whatever, who have no—who have a longing, a feeling for, a positive attitude toward Italy or Greece or wherever, but who are through and through Americans. First, last, and always, their allegiance is here.

So it is difficult, I find, when I go back home, professor, or when I speak on other fora out of this city on foreign policy matters, to communicate to people that there may be a difference in attitude in other parts of the world, particularly Europe and the former Soviet Union.

One of the things that I think is important for this committee to have a sense of is the degree to which there is a strong desire on the part of people who heretofore have been referred to as ethnic Russians to associate with Russia as opposed to feeling very comfortable within Ukraine or Belarus or the Baltic States.

And conversely, the degree to which there is an urge, a nationalist movement within Ukraine to segregate those who are viewed as Russian, ethnic Russians. I just wonder if you would speak with me about that dynamic.

Because if, for example, there is, and I have been told repeatedly—I was aware of at least three of the examples that you gave where political leadership in Ukraine at this moment in certain areas is held by what would otherwise be referred to as ethnic Russians. But yet, they are Ukrainian officials.

We went through a good deal of discussion and a good deal of anticipation as to what some of the military personnel who were Russian nationals but had lived in and resided in and were married to Ukrainians would do once the military in Russia, the central command, essentially, broke up. What would they do? Would they pick up and head from Kiev? And by the way, what is the Ukrainian pronunciation of Kiev?

Dr. BILINSKY. Sir, I think it is in the interest of world peace, world linguistics, and Ukraine, not to insist on any change in the pronunciation of Kiev.

Senator BIDEN. OK, that makes it easier for me. But to return to the subject at hand, I remember us having hearings on this issue, and people were wondering whether or not military commanders located in Kiev, who are Russian nationals, but living in Ukraine for 25 years, be required to head back to Russia?

So this whole issue of ethnic peace, so to speak, within Ukraine, will I imagine, have a tremendous impact on what will or will not happen in Ukraine.

Could you speak to that for just a moment?

Dr. BILINSKY. Sir, I would be glad to. Some public opinion surveys have been done by Professor Ian Bremmer of Stanford University, and the overall conclusions are that there are differences among the ethnic Russians in Ukraine. He investigated the ethnic Russian community in Kiev. Then he investigated the ethnic Russian community in the Crimea and in Lviv.

One of the most helpful signs is that I know from the late Professor Beklemishev that the ethnic Russian community in Kiev is very understanding toward the Ukrainian cause, and they are rather sympathetic to the efforts at building statehood, even if it means that some concessions would have to be made in the long run on the cultural front.

I know as a fact that the grandson of President Kravchuk attends a Russian-language school, but some of the books that he reads are now different than the books that he had been reading before. The Russian community in Lviv, they feel somewhat pressured. Lviv is a more aggressive Ukrainian city, but they are not about to revolt and go to Russia.

It is the rather conservative Russian community in the Crimea that is a problem.

Senator BIDEN. And is that the largest of the communities?

Dr. BILINSKY. Yes. In the Crimea, the Tatars, the original inhabitants, number about 10 percent. Ukrainians number about one-third, and the rest are Russians. They are a problem insofar as they had not been in the habit of reading democratic Russian newspapers. The stuff that they had been receiving in 1990 was the most conservative stuff that they could get out of Russia, and some of them feel that they are in an outpost or so. But the Crimea, if I may say this for the record, first of all, is a peninsula that should be, if not fully restored to the Tatars, the Tatars should be given greater rights in the Crimea.

The status of the Tatars, I believe, is an issue of conscience for Russian Democrats and for Ukrainian Democrats. I am delighted that I had the privilege of meeting the late General Grigorenko, who was very much in favor of Tatars' rights, and of course, Gen-

eral Grigorenko's friend was the late Academician Sakharov. And his widow, Yelena Bonner continues that genuine-democratic tradition.

Concessions would have to be made by the Russians. Concessions would have to be made by the Ukrainians. But the Crimea is necessary for Ukraine because it is athwart the sea route from Odessa to Georgia, and Georgia is now being considered a gateway to the Middle East. And Shevardnadze, who is not unknown in Washington, Shevardnadze is very much in favor of cooperation with Ukraine, and economic cooperation.

Now, what about the military officers, the more concrete business? They would be, I think, thinking where ultimately their loyalties lay, what to do. The most objective—the most objective analysis that I have seen is by Prof. Christopher Donnelly, formerly with Sandhurst College. He said that yes, most of the officers had taken an oath to support the Ukraine, but they may have taken the oath thinking about their pensions, thinking whether they would stay, and so on and so forth.

At the same time, living in Ukraine outside of these tough times is relatively pleasant, and it would be difficult—I honestly believe it would be difficult for ethnic military officers in Ukraine to conspire against Ukrainian independence and then break with their fellow officers who are ethnic Ukrainians or officers of ethnic mixed families. They would be in a hard position.

Some might do it. The majority, I think, would be neutral or perhaps even sympathetic to the State of Ukraine, even in a crunch, even in a crunch.

Mr. LIBBY. If I could add one word on this subject.

Senator BIDEN. Please.

Mr. LIBBY. The Ukrainian Minister of Defense when he took his job did not speak Ukrainian, he spoke only Russian. He has since learned it on the job, which is pretty impressive. And he has used that position in conjunction with the downsizing of the forces to try to solve the obvious problem that you are alluding to.

I think, to use a phrase from today's headlines in America, unit cohesion in a situation of crisis would be an issue that any commander would have to be doubtful about.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you, Mr. Blair, what I asked the first panel. Last week, as you well know, the defense ministers abruptly dissolved the CIS joint military command, and, I believe, abandoned the efforts to maintain the unified defense structure of the CIS. What will be the effect, if any, of this on command and control of nuclear weapons, if we can guess at that?

Dr. BLAIR. I would say zero.

Senator BIDEN. Tell me why.

Dr. BLAIR. Well, for two reasons. One, as I said in my statement, Shaposhnikov, I think, was cut out of the nuclear loop back in September when Maximov and others also were retired, who is the former commander of the strategic rocket forces.

Second, when Shaposhnikov was a nuclear authority, and I believe that it was before September of last year, he was an authority who gave permission to use nuclear weapons as did Boris Yeltsin, but he is not an individual who actually had very much of a role to play in the nuclear control system. The general staff at that time

still actually controlled the nuclear forces, and these appointments were somewhat symbolic.

Senator BIDEN. One of the things that you said today, if true, and I have no reason to believe is not correct, gives me some solace and seems to fit in with the points being made by your two colleagues at the table, is that to basically give Ukraine more time here, not strong-arm anything right now. If your analysis is correct about the present value, present control, and in the immediate future, probable capability of the nuclear arsenal left in Ukraine, then attrition, the passage of time, does not increase the danger presented. It diminishes the danger presented by the possibility of Ukraine maintaining physical control of these weapons.

First of all, do I understand—I realize I have unfairly abbreviated your testimony, and perhaps not accurately, but is that a generally correct assessment based on what you said today?

Dr. BLAIR. Basically, that is true.

Senator BIDEN. You would have to test, would you not? In other words, would any military leader credibly rely upon the SS-19's or the SS-24's without having tested them in the relatively near term?

Dr. BLAIR. I think it is hard to know. But I think the SS-19's probably could be considered reliable but not the SS-24's because of the radical changes that would have to be made to those systems. But they are all assets that are growing obsolete. I think Ukraine's option, as you put it, is to cobble together something that is losing its vitality and it would take Herculean effort and resources on the part of Ukraine, and sophistication.

They certainly do have a lot of sophistication and technical expertise, but it would be a tremendous program to try to create a viable nuclear deterrent and sustain it over time. In the short term, they can, on paper, see some assets that are still viable, cobble together something, but it is going to be of diminishing credence and effectiveness as time wears on.

So bottomline, I do not think Ukraine is willing, even though they believe that they have hardly any other options, that they really think Russia is imperial, that there is a serious threat to their sovereignty. They just do not have the resources and cannot manage it. I think they kind of accept that.

So they have built up a conventional army of some strength. It is larger than Germany's and France's. And it is serious. So perhaps that is probably the one material security development that I heard today at this panel that could address this problem for Ukraine, and that was the news that we are going to work seriously with Ukraine on its conventional capabilities.

Senator BIDEN. Let me ask you all one last question, and I would appreciate it if you would each respond to this. What is recognized as a legitimate Ukrainian concern is a definition of their security requirements. No one in the administration, or out of the administration, with whom I have spoken suggests that it is not legitimate for Ukraine to be concerned about her security arrangements.

The question comes down to what is a legitimate and achievable security arrangement that would be sufficient to satisfy Ukraine's security needs.

Now, I realize this is an essay question, but what guarantees or assurances do you believe are necessary, if any, to be made by the United States or the European Community to meet legitimate security concerns of Ukraine?

Dr. BILINSKY. I believe, sir, that if the Ukrainian Parliament decides that nuclear arms are necessary, it may not be a good idea to tell the popularly elected Parliament that they do not know the situation.

There is a very interesting declaration of 162 parliamentarians that was issued in April of this year. I have tried to decipher some of the signatures. Fortunately, they provided the names of the electoral districts, and yes, there are some in the 162 which constitutes more than one-third of the Ukrainian Parliament.

There were some such as Tolubko, General Volodymyr, who incidentally may be a relative of the Soviet Marshal of the Artillery Volodymyr Tolubko, who had been the commanding officer of the entire Soviet strategic force. There has been some discussion, are the Ukrainians competent or not? Well, it may run in the family. Tolubko is clearly in favor of maintaining nuclear forces. There is Derkach from western Ukraine, a young nationalist deputy who is in favor. Khmara is definitely in favor of nuclear forces. Let us say, outside of Tolubko, it is a kind of group on the right.

But there is also a group in the center, the former First Deputy Prime Minister Ihor Yukhnovsky, who wants compensation for the missiles that are going to be yielded, and Yukhnovsky, incidentally, is crystal clear that the missiles have to be detargeted from the United States and detargeted forthwith. And if the United States would help with the development of the manufacturing process for the heptyl toxic liquid propellant, that would also be a good thing.

So there is the second group who are conditionally in favor of keeping those weapons for a time. And as I look at the numbers, one of those who signed the declaration of 162 in April was Prime Minister Kuchma from electoral district 21. And Kuchma says that there should be a compromise, START I has to be ratified, but some other missiles—SS-24's—should be kept, and other missiles. So, do the Ukrainians really need those missiles? Perhaps the Ukrainians should decide that after a reasonable debate, and they had better decide it before long.

Security guarantees include the ability to approach NATO, at least through the back door. Sir, there is a very disturbing development that unfortunately was not brought out in the testimony earlier. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin made a major speech at dedicating the Garmisch Center on June 5 of this year in which he talked about creating a seamless web of security arrangements. But somehow, Ukraine was not included in these arrangements that are being concluded.

President Walesa of Poland is very much in favor of a strong Ukraine and also military cooperation with Ukraine, and President Walesa was in Kiev about 2 weeks before Secretary of Defense Aspin gave that conceptual speech in Garmisch Partenkirchen, and under American diplomatic pressure—I quote Ron Pepeski from Reuter—the Poles were told not to conclude a defense arrangement with Ukraine.

It almost looks as if Ukrainians are being pushed into and limited to, the Russian sphere of influence, which I think is not quite fair. It would be helpful, sir, if the United States could offer not ironclad guarantees but cooperation and also no political backing for the Russians raising the issue of national minorities, and because national minorities in Ukraine are treated very well, Russians raising the issue of the Black Sea Fleet.

All this fleet business, I am afraid, is shadowboxing because behind the Black Sea Fleet there is the Lukin doctrine. Lukin may still be the Russian Ambassador to Washington so far as I know. And the Lukin doctrine is that, No. 1, the Ukrainians had no business approaching the West like the East Europeans did with their concept of neutrality and trying to get support from the West without us Russians. And No. 2, Lukin wants to use the Black Sea Fleet, the Crimean issue, defense orders, to destabilize Ukraine.

And on top of this we have got the Rodionov doctrine of May 1992, which says that Russia has vital interests from the Pacific Ocean to the Atlantic Ocean.

Sir, my question is: why has the United States not told Lukin that destabilization of Ukraine might not be in the interest of the United States? Certainly, it is not in the interest of Russian democracy. And why not ask what Rodionov had in mind with his vital interests from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, with unlimited access to the Baltic and the Black Sea?

He was, incidentally, correct on the Baltic States. He said, with the Baltic States we have to make an agreement and pay the Baltic States for the use of ports, et cetera, et cetera. On Ukraine—nothing, meaning that apparently he wants Ukraine to disappear so that Russia will have free access to the Black Sea.

They should have been called to account. It was Mr. P.H. Vigor of Sandhurst who spent a seminar on this in Philadelphia under Dr. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, and he said that something there is wrong. A very ambitious claim. Nothing happened. No protest from the United States against Rodionov, no protest from the United States against Lukin, and now they are trying to ride roughshod over Lithuania, Estonia, Ukraine, Georgia, what have you.

Thank you.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Mr. LIBBY. I would say, sir, that they do not need nuclear weapons; but they need some language, at least psychologically at a bare minimum, that they can hold up and say we have some guarantees, but that would have language that you could drive a truck through. In short, I believe what they need is a sort of forward-leaning ambiguity from the West.

They are not going to get a security guarantee, but they might well get something that looks forward-leaning, that makes it at least ambiguous to the Russians as to what the Western reaction would be. This could be coupled with a type of Finnish defense, a defense of Ukrainian territory which would be designed to slow down and make it very costly for someone to invade and with the realization that Russia is not going to do this tomorrow. For such a dire threat to materialize, there would first have to be a Russia different from the one we see today—in short, a reversionary Russia—and there should be enough ties between NATO and the West

and Central Europe and Ukraine by that point to make it clear, as these other countries become more democratic, that a reversionary Russia would get all of our attention.

Senator BIDEN. Thank you.

Dr. Blair, one last question for you and we will end.

Is my impression correct, that purely from an analyst's standpoint, Ukraine is worse off having the apparently inoperable nuclear weapons they have in their possession and a Russia that does not meet the reduction in limits set in START I and proposed in START II, than they would be if they were to give up those weapons and not impede further limitations set out in START I and START II from coming to fruition in Russia?

Dr. BLAIR. Well first of all, as long as strategic forces are in Ukraine, they are going to be in our strategic war plan, which is not a particularly healthy relationship between the two countries.

Second, as you say, if they hold onto weapons, and impede reductions of Russian weapons, then it is counterproductive, clearly.

Senator BIDEN. For them.

Dr. BLAIR. For them. For the Ukrainians, absolutely. But I would have to point out that I think that Russia is going to go down to START II levels in any case.

Senator BIDEN. Yes, no matter what.

Dr. BLAIR. And it will just complicate the picture and we will have to work out a side arrangement between Russia and the United States.

But I think the logic is clear that if Ukraine eliminates nuclear weapons it keeps this process of reductions rolling. We have to remember that Yeltsin has been fairly radical on strategic arms reductions.

Senator BIDEN. I would say so.

Dr. BLAIR. And that is very much moving things in the direction of providing Ukraine with the kind of security guarantee that it hopes for.

Senator BIDEN. Well, it is extremely complicated. Your testimony has been very helpful. It has not changed my view but has changed my attitude about the degree of urgency and the necessity, the desirability of using tactics early on that may not be necessary.

All three of you have provided us with very enlightening testimony. Dr. Blair, I take some solace from your assessment of the present and future capability of the existing systems in place and the impact of time on those systems and their reliability, as well as Dr. Bilinsky, on your view expressed that the democratic movement within Ukraine is recognized as the answer to the ultimate security because it relates to Ukraine's ability to look West.

And your point, Mr. Libby, in implying that there is a growing recognition over time in Ukraine of the need to accommodate the minority Russian population and integrate it in a way create a multiethnic society in a fledgling nation with democratic institutions.

There is a lot of work cut out for us. I suspect, Dr. Bilinsky, that we are going to make a fair number of missteps in the process, but I think that is, quite frankly, to be expected. And there seems to be, at least in my view, a bit more latitude and a bit less of the sky is falling panic as it relates to working our way toward a New

World Order, if you will, especially in the former Soviet Union, that enhances the prospect that we are going to have a peaceful decade and not a dangerous one.

I still am very worried about the impact of what we do or do not do in Bosnia and what effect that will have. I found a disturbing relationship when I was in Serbia, and I will not bore you with the details, but while I was meeting with Milosevic, meetings were taking place between the significant members of the Russian Parliament and members of the Serbian Government. I had the greatest difficulty convincing my colleagues here in Washington that Yeltsin—why Yeltsin kept acting in a way that seemed inconsistent with the overall Russian attitude toward Serbia.

I kept arguing that it is because it would be the worst thing that could happen to Yeltsin should Milosevic succeed. It would undermine the notion of territorial integrity and the necessity of ethnic tolerance.

But you all have contributed a great deal to this discussion, which I assume will be the first of many hearings that we hope to have on this subject.

I appreciate your testimony and your time. Thank you for coming back, Dr. Blair, and thank you for putting yourself in the position, Professor Bilinsky, where I am sitting at the podium and you in the chair. You were very gracious.

And I thank you, Mr. Libby.

Thank you very much. We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 6:31 p.m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR TALBOTT TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question. Is parliamentary ratification of START I a requirement under Ukraine's constitution?

Answer. The original Ukrainian SSR constitution, which remains in force, has no provisions for ratification of foreign treaties by the parliament.

On August 1, 1991, the constitution was amended to establish the office of the President of Ukraine.

This amendment includes a change to Article 114-5, which specifies among the powers of the President as follows: "8) (The President of the Ukrainian SSR) conducts negotiations and signs interstate and international treaties of the Ukrainian SSR, which enter into force following ratification by the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet (Parliament);".

Although this section deals with Presidential powers, the requirement for Parliamentary ratification is clearly stated, even though there has been no parallel amendment of the section on the Parliament's powers.

In addition, the draft constitution of Ukraine, which has not yet been adopted, contains direct language specifying ratification of treaties as a power of the Parliament in Article 111-4: "(The National Council shall:) 4. ratify, adopt, approve, denounce or suspend international, intergovernmental treaties or decide Ukraine's adherence to them;".

Question. If Ukraine ratifies START I, but does not accede to the NPT, will the administration encourage Russia to drop its condition on Ukraine NPT accession so that START I can enter into force?

Answer. The administration strongly believes that Ukraine should fulfill its Lisbon Protocol commitments both to ratify START I and to accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state in the shortest possible time. Senior officials of the Ukrainian Government, including President Kravchuk, have continued to state their support for ratification of START and accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon state. Prompt Ukrainian accession to the NPT is not only important in itself, but also would provide an unmistakable indication that Ukraine intends to fulfill its obligation to eliminate all nuclear weapons and all strategic offensive arms from its territory within START I's 7-year reductions period.

At the same time, during U.S. START I consideration, the Senate decided against imposing a condition binding on the Executive Branch that absolutely linked the timing of START ratification and NPT accession—not because the U.S. feels any less strongly than Russia about Ukraine fulfilling all of its Lisbon obligations, but simply because such a condition could limit the ability of a party to adjust to changing circumstances in ways that could best foster START implementation and the fulfillment of these obligations. Should Ukraine ratify START I but not accede to the NPT, the United States will have to consider its available options at that time in light of U.S. security interests and non-proliferation goals.

Question. What is status of the negotiations on sharing of the proceeds of the sale of highly enriched uranium from former Soviet warheads?

Have Russia and Ukraine taken steps toward agreeing on how proceeds be divided?

Will Ukraine be compensated with money, with LEU, or a combination of the two?

How will the United States be assured that uranium that it purchases is actually extracted from dismantled warheads?

Answer. We understand that Russia and Ukraine have been meeting to work out appropriate arrangements on the sharing of proceeds from HEU sales, and it appears that the two sides are making progress. Although we are not privy to the specific details of these discussions, the compensation arrangements apparently involve a combination of LEU suitable for use in Ukrainian civilian nuclear facilities, and cash payment.

We are currently negotiating with the Russians on transparency measures that will provide us with assurances that the HEU we are purchasing is derived from dismantled nuclear warheads.

Question. Is Ukraine requesting a specific monetary amount to defray the costs of strategic weapons dismantlement?

Answer. In September 1992, President Kravchuk requested \$174 million in Nunn-Lugar assistance, the majority of which was anticipated to be applied to strategic weapons dismantlement. In response, the U.S. pledged to provide at least \$175 million in assistance. Since then, some Ukrainians have informally stated that they require up to \$6 billion to meet their dismantlement requirements, but they have never raised this figure in SSD discussions or provided a detailed breakdown of projected expenses to justify this request.

The sides have held a number of rounds of technical discussions to determine the type, amount and cost of assistance needed by Ukraine in the area of strategic weapons dismantlement. Continued discussions will allow the U.S. to formulate with Ukraine the appropriate amount and character of assistance.

The U.S. is eager to further this process and has expressed its willingness to the government of Ukraine to consider seriously any projects that will assist them in this area.

Question. Has Ukraine officially responded to the U.S. proposal to store warheads in Ukraine at a site subject to international monitoring? Has Russia?

Answer. We continue to work closely with the governments of Ukraine and Russia on this idea. We have had a series of discussion with both parties beginning with Secretary Aspin's meetings with his Russian and Ukrainian counterparts in early June: Recent consultations with Deputy Foreign Minister Mamedov of Russia and Deputy Foreign Minister Tarasyuk of Ukraine were particularly helpful in clarifying some points. This is an important agenda item in our relations with both countries, and we continue to discuss it with both parties at every opportunity.

Question. Reuters reported on May 25, 1993 that the United States, through diplomatic channels, made clear to the Polish government that Washington was unhappy about a Polish initiative to create an East European security system.

Please comment on this report.

Answer. The Reuters report is erroneous. There was no such communication.

The United States views NATO as the keystone to transatlantic security. We have urged the states of Central and Eastern Europe to make maximum use of the opportunities for consultation and practical cooperation on matters of mutual concern in the NACC.

The various mechanisms and fora of the CSCE also make important and distinctive contributions to security in Europe. We have a very active cooperation with the CEE states in this context as well.

These multilateral contacts, together with our growing bilateral security concerns, are creating a web of security relations that can begin to address some of the near-term security concerns of the region. For example, in Athens last month, the NACC agreed to pursue a variety of practical steps that will provide a solid foundation for joint peacekeeping efforts.

We believe efforts to strengthen and reinforce CSCE and the NACC hold more promise than altogether new initiatives, but we are not reflexively dismissive of such ideas.

RESPONSES OF SECRETARY SLOCOMBE TO QUESTIONS ASKED BY SENATOR BIDEN

Question. After your testimony today, Bruce Blair testified that contrary to widespread belief, the payloads in the custody of units at two strategic airbases in Ukraine "probably include a sizable quantity of tactical nuclear weapons for strike aircraft." Mr. Blair's statement could contradict your testimony that all tactical nuclear weapons have been removed from Ukrainian soil. Please comment on this potential discrepancy, and, if necessary, clarify your answer.

Answer. First, the IC judges that [deleted]. It is possible that Mr. Blair is referring to the ALCM warheads, which are not properly classified as "tactical warheads." If he has any evidence that other tactical air delivered nuclear weapons are in Ukraine, it would be helpful if he would provide it.

Question. You stated that there are "136 SS-19 launchers" in Ukraine. My information was that there were 130 SS-19 launchers. Has the number increased, or was my information incorrect?

Answer. This was a misstatement. There are 130 SS-19 launchers in Ukraine.

ICBMS IN THE UKRAINE

Question. Are the ICBMs in the Ukraine still on alert status? If not, how many have been taken off alert status? If they are not on full alert status, how would you describe the present status and how long would it take to return the ICBMs to a full alert status?

Answer. The Ukrainians claim that the ICBMs on their soil are not currently on alert status. The Ukrainians also claim—which is supported independently by our evidence—that they do not have operational control over the ICBMs on their soil. The Russians continue to exercise the missiles from a command and control standpoint. It is difficult to confirm within the context of a U.S. definition that all the missiles in Ukraine are indeed off alert.

If we assume that they were not on alert, the length of time required to return them to full alert status would depend on who was controlling such an operation. If they remain under Russian control, it would only take them a period of time measured in minutes in order to return the ICBMs to a full operational alert status. On the other hand, if the Ukrainians gained complete control, returning all the ICBMs to full alert status would represent a formidable task inasmuch as they lack sufficient numbers of trained operations and logistics personnel. As a result, it would likely take them at least a year to establish full alert, but at the same time, there would be serious question regarding its reliability.

ALCMs IN THE UKRAINE

Question. You stated that, "We don't know exactly where the [ICBMs on Ukraine soil] are targeted, but * * * we have no reason to believe the targeting has changed." Do we know if any of the ALCMs are still targeted at the United States? Assuming that weapons are still targeted at the United States and targets in Western Europe, does Ukraine have the technical capability to re-target the missile on Russia and if so on what time scale?

Answer. We do not know if any ALCMs currently under Ukraine's control are still targeted at the United States. It is possible, however, that if U.S. targets were programmed into the Russian cruise missiles prior to Ukraine gaining operational control over them and their delivery BEAR aircraft, those targets might still remain programmed in the missiles.

We believe that Ukraine—while possessing delivery systems—currently lacks the ability to carry out a credible nuclear threat against the U.S., even though they claim that their newly acquired bomber force is operational. Evidence, however, suggests the opposite is true. They do not offer sufficient flying time and other support related training to substantiate a claim that their ALCM/bomber force is operational. We have serious doubts, therefore, that they could prepare and mount a credible nuclear force to deliver ALCMs to their targets, given their current state of readiness and the lack of certain interface equipment required to handle and operate missiles.

Question. What is the assessment of the Defense Department regarding the minimum ranges of the SS-19s and SS-24s? If the IC holds a different view, please provide it.

Answer. [Deleted.]

Question. What is the IC's estimate with regard to the number of strategic bombers—and nuclear weapons associated with them—that remain on Ukraine soil?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Question. Please comment on reports that strategic missiles and their warheads are no longer being maintained by CIS (Russian) personnel. What is the estimated life of warheads without significant maintenance? Can Ukraine provide the necessary service? Do inadequately serviced warheads or missiles present a safety problem?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Question. Please provide the following information regarding Ukraine's conventional forces. What is the current number of troops in its armed forces? Please provide a breakdown by service.



Answer. Currently the armed forces of the Ukraine number about 530,000. Current make up is:

Ground forces ¹	220,000
Air force	95,000
Air defense	63,000
MoD and staff	13,000
MoD units	34,000
Navy ground	12,000
Navy ²	20,000
Other military ²	73,000

¹Strategic rocket forces are likely incorporated in ground forces. Indications are that strategic rocket forces in Ukraine are staffed by an ad hoc contingent composed of CIS, Ukrainian and other FSU service members. Best estimates are that this force is composed of approximately 20,000 soldiers.

²The Navy number assumes that ½ of the Black Sea Fleet force will belong to the Ukraine. The division of the Black Sea Fleet assets has not yet been resolved between Russia and the Ukraine. Other military includes maintenance and mobilization base personnel, university educational staff, and military commissariats. In addition, the Ukraine also has some 63,000 troops in non-MoD paramilitary forces, which include its national guard and border guard units.

Question. Please provide an assessment of the conventional balance of power between Ukraine and Russia west of the Urals. Specifically: (1) Please assess the quality of military equipment—main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, helicopters, and aircraft—in the Ukrainian arsenal compared to that owned by Russia west of the Urals.

Answer. [Deleted.]

Question. (2) What are Ukraine's "reduction obligations" under the CFE Treaty? Is Ukraine meeting them?

Answer. Ukraine has declared the following reduction liabilities: tanks—2,124; armored combat vehicles—1,545; and combat aircraft—560. It has declared no liabilities to reduce artillery or attack helicopters. Ukraine is well on its way toward achieving the first year's 25% of its notified reduction obligation. To date, 89 percent of the first year obligation for battle tanks, 105 percent for armored combat vehicles, and 53 percent for combat aircraft have been reduced or have been scheduled for reduction. There are however, two categories of Treaty-limited equipment for which the Ukraine must assume partial responsibilities but which remain to be resolved. The reduction liabilities of the former Soviet Union were collectively assumed by the successor states of the Soviet Union. Thus far, the collective reduction liabilities of the successor states do not total those of the former Soviet Union. TLE for which successor states have not assumed a liability number 2,120 items, including 605 tanks, 1,434 ACVs, and 81 artillery pieces. The second category involves former Soviet naval TLE which Russia and the Ukraine have not yet divided. Involved are 933 tanks, 1,725 ACVs, and 1,080 artillery pieces.

Question. (3) Based on its size and potential capability, how would you rank the Ukrainian conventional forces after implementation of the CFE Treaty compared to other parties to the treaty?

Answer. [Deleted.]

Question. (4) What rights does Ukraine have to inspect Russian armed forces under the CFE Treaty?

Answer. The CFE Treaty allows all member states to inspect all other member states. Under provisions of Section II, Paragraph 24, of the CFE Treaty, the Ukraine may inspect Russia up to five times per year.

Question. Under the Administration's proposal to store warheads in Ukraine at a site subject to international monitoring, when would warheads be transferred to Russia for dismantlement? When would all the warheads be withdrawn? Would Ukraine be able to monitor the dismantlement of the warheads in Russia?

Answer. The objective of the U.S. proposal for early deactivation of strategic offensive arms located in Ukraine is to begin removal of nuclear warheads from missiles as soon as possible, in advance of entry into force of the START I Treaty.

[Deleted.]

Question. Have the United States and Ukraine scheduled another SSD meeting?

Answer. While the U.S. has proposed meetings to discuss Nunn-Lugar assistance, no firm date for an SSD meeting has yet been agreed upon.

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